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Abstract
This thesis aims to understand the dynamics underlying payout poli-
cies for companies listed on the public stock exchange.
The dividend policy affects the liquid assets of companies both
directly, given the size of the dividend paid, and indirectly, affect-
ing the ability of companies to attract sources of financing in the
immediate future.
The thesis proposes an optimal dividend payout model that de-
scribes managers' behavior. Every year, managers have to choose
whether to change their payout policy (by increasing or decreasing
dividends) or to maintain the level of dividends paid in the previous
period. We assume that the dividend policy is based on observ-
able state variables (earnings at the beginning of the period and
payout policy during the last period) and unobservable state vari-
ables (conflicts between managers and shareholders/bondholders, id-
iosyncratic risks and growth opportunities). We derive the optimal
dividend policy from the solution of the stochastic discrete choice
dynamic programming problem. The model depends on unknown
primitive parameters that regulate the expectations of managers on
future values of state variables. The maximization of the utility
function provides the optimal strategy for the manager.
Using annual balance-sheet data for companies operating in the
Euro area, we estimate the structural parameters of the model using
a nested fixed point algorithm, and we test whether managers choices
are consistent concerning the model predictions.
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Introduction
Periodically, the board of directors of listed companies, to finance
the businesses, must choose between internal and external sources
of financing.
The choice of the source inevitably has an impact on the dividend
policy. Indeed, a company that chooses to finance investment only
through internal fund would set dividends as a remaining part of
the investment policy. On the other hand, a company that decides
to finance its investments through external fund alone may freely
transfer net profits to the shareholders.
The economic literature on corporate finance has long been ques-
tioning the actual costs and benefits of alternative sources of financ-
ing and how the management of cash flows affects the firms' value.
Neoclassical economic theory provides valuable insights into this
specific aspect of corporate finance. Keynes (1934) assumes that a
manager who wants to maximize shareholders' equity retains a level
of internal funds such that the marginal benefit equals the marginal
cost. Assuming perfect capital markets,1 Miller and Modigliani
(1958) show that financing choices do not influence the companies'
value; therefore the different sources of financing are considered per-
fect substitutes by the manager. Furthermore, Miller and Modigliani
(1961) show that the decisions on dividend payments do not affect
1The perfect capital market hypothesis consists of a perfectly competitive
market, with rational agents, without information asymmetries and frictions
generated by transaction costs, taxes and regulatory constraints.
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the companies' valuation, because shareholders are indifferent be-
tween dividends and the cash held within the company increasing
the shares' value.
Their analysis is based on the perfect market hypothesis; how-
ever, issues such as uncertainty about future cash flows, taxation,
agent's irrationality, market competition, and information asymme-
tries determine the distance between neoclassical theory predictions
and empirical evidence on dividends (Cohen, 2002).
The objective of the thesis is to verify whether the managers'
payout decision coincides with an optimal payment rule that deter-
mines the dividend policy as a function of observable and unobserv-
able state variables. We assume that managers, the decision-makers,
employ the dividend policy to control agency conflict and maximize
their utility function.2 As a consequence, managers take sequen-
tial decisions regarding the payment of dividends under uncertainty
about future cash flows.
By assuming the rationality of the agents, we define the optimal
decision rule as the solution of the stochastic dynamic programming
discrete choice model.
The dynamic programming allows determining a procedure able
to calculate the optimal decision rule by breaking the problem into
a sequence of deterministic optimization problems. The features of
this model enable us to measure what we consider the fundamental
factors that affect the manager's payout choices: agency conflict
and sunk costs of dividend omissions. Arguably, the estimate of
the impact of these costs on the manager's utility is necessary to
define how the conditional probability of paying dividends varies if
the government wants to implement fiscal policy, aimed to reduce
the exposure of the economy to excessive corporate leverage, through
allowances on corporate debt.
2See Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Jensen (1986).
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Chapter 1
Literature Review
The managers of companies with liquidity excess have to choose
whether to distribute the extra cash among shareholders (as a divi-
dend payment or through share repurchases) or to keep it to finance
future projects.1
Several studies show that share prices temporarily change as a
result of changes in payout policy. Therefore, increasing the dividend
level may increase firms' market value. Moreover, several empirical
studies show that investors interpret dividend cuts as bad news,
causing a reduction in the firms' market value. Hence, the managers
may choose to quit or scale down investment projects so as not to
be forced to cut dividends. However, both the effects in some cases
are stable in others are temporary.
Over the years, different theories and models have been devised
to analyze and explain:
1. the degree of substitutability among sources of financing;
2. the changes in the level of dividends in the different periods;
3. the timing of dividends;
1Easterbrook (1984) and Jensen (1986).
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4. the degree of substitutability among payment methods to
shareholders (i.e., the optimal mix between dividends and
share repurchases).
In the next sections, we examine the main theories and mod-
els proposed in the literature, focusing primarily on Miller and
Modigliani (1958, 1961); then we investigate the financial market
imperfections that affect the assumption of market perfection and
completeness (Acharya, Almeida, and Campello, 2007; Almeida,
Campello, and Weisbach, 2004).
1.1 The Irrelevance Proposition Theo-
rems
Miller and Modigliani (1958) seek to establish how variations of the
debt to equity ratio affect the value of a company. They used for
the first time the political economy analytical tools (specifically, the
standard Fisherian framework with an infinite time horizon) in the
analysis of corporate finance issues. Miller and Modigliani elaborate
a model of equilibrium assuming perfect competition with rational
and symmetrically informed agents. Moreover, they assume a world
without market frictions such as taxation, transaction costs, and
uncertainty about future share prices.
Therefore, assuming a perfect capital market, Miller and
Modigliani demonstrate that the capital composition does not al-
ter the value of the company; the irrelevance proposition theorem.
It implies that the forms of financing (external and internal) are
perfect substitutes, thus the companies have no benefit in accumu-
lating financial resources to finance investment opportunities or to
deal with future adverse shocks.
Modigliani and Miller (1963) extend the previous model by in-
troducing a tax rate on corporate earnings. They show that the
company can benefit from external financing with the so-called tax
shield. Moreover, they find that the advantage of external funding
2
1.1. THE IRRELEVANCE PROPOSITION THEOREMS
depends on the deductibility of interests paid on debt. Thus, the
value of a company that has a debt will be higher than that of a
company totally equity financed by an amount equal to the present
value of the tax advantages. Consequently, one of the predictions
of this model is that there should be a substantial prevalence of so-
called corner solutions. In other words, we should observe a large
number of companies that finance the major part of investments with
debt. Therefore, Miller e Modigliani demonstrate how the introduc-
tion of a tax system affects the substitutability degree of external
and internal sources of financing.
Miller and Modigliani (1961) state the irrelevance of payout pol-
icy on the company's value. The authors illustrate the possible con-
sequences of a change in dividend policy through the famous home-
made dividend hypothesis.
According to this hypothesis, in perfect financial markets, in-
vestors are indifferent between the return generated by dividends
and the expected return given by the growth of the share price. In-
deed, if the manager chooses not to distribute profits, the share price
should increase proportionally given the extra-liquidity retained in
the company. The shareholders should be able to replicate the same
return through the sale of an equal share of stock. Furthermore, the
manager could pay a dividend higher than the free-cash flow gen-
erated by the company. In this case, the board would be forced to
enhance external funds filling the difference between the dividend
and the free-cash flow, not increasing the value of the company.
Therefore, Miller and Modigliani show that investors will not be
willing to pay a higher price for shares of a firm that regularly pay
out dividends than shares of a company that does not. However, it
is necessary that agents rationally assume that companies sooner or
later distribute the total value generated by their investments.
1.1.1 Market Frictions
Miller and Modigliani's theorems are a cornerstone for the evalua-
tion of choices related to the capital structure and dividend policy
3
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of a company. However, the authors themselves are aware of the
limitations of their model. In their articles, they stress that the as-
sumptions of the model are so stringent as to make the results of
irrelevance a benchmark for further analysis.
We present the main frictions that affect the market perfection
assumption:
1. Taxes. In the previous section, we have seen how the degree
of substitutability of sources of funding varies by introducing
taxation that affects the profits of the company. However,
Miller (1998) notes that US companies do not make the most
of the potential for leverage, burning around 150 billion per
year in taxes. Moreover, in the United States, Europe, and
many other countries, dividend income is taxed at a higher
(personal) rate than the capital gains generated by invested
capital. Therefore, rational investors should prefer the capital
gains generated by buying and selling shares, particularly those
investors who are already subject to high taxation (Foley et
al., 2007).
2. Transaction costs. They are all costs that a company or in-
vestor sustains in making any exchange. Choosing the financial
source, a company has to bear costs such as brokerage fees,
sales commissions, legal expenses, and incidental expenses.
Transaction costs are extremely high when an individual de-
cides to liquidate an investment.2 Therefore, this kind of cost
changes according to the economic sector in which the com-
pany operates. The transaction cost can modify the debt and
payout policies, as well as the preferences of an investor.
3. Precautionary motives. Firms tend to prefer internal sources
of finance to cover unforeseen expenses or contingencies whose
development is uncertain. In unstable and extremely volatile
2The liquidation of a machinery/equipment can be very difficult for a firm
because it could be tough to find a buyer and so, the firm could be obliged to
depreciate its asset.
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economies, the frequency with which negative shocks occur for
the company is very high. Therefore, under the same condi-
tions, companies operating in these economies need a greater
availability of liquid resources to counter unexpected drops in
sales, to take timely advantage of investment opportunities
that may arise suddenly, and in some cases to not be forced to
change the predetermined payout policy.
4. Financial constraints. Firms structurally accumulate liquid-
ity when access to the credit market is limited. Specifically, a
company is defined as financially constrained when its access
to the capital market is more expensive than other firms with
the same growth opportunities. Firms financially constrained
are, therefore, forced to manage liquidity in such a way as
to maximize the value of the firm and mitigate the higher
cost of external financing (Acharya, Almeida, and Campello,
2007; Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach, 2004). Financial
constraints limit the ability of companies to both raise new
capital to finance new investments and to obtain the liquid-
ity necessary to meet programmed payout policies. In fact, in
economies where capital markets are not efficient, companies
will need more cash to finance investments and not be forced
to give up projects with positive net present value (NPV ).
Moreover, as mentioned, companies are reluctant to reduce
the dividends paid to shareholders. Thus, if they do not have
direct access to the capital market would be forced to create
reserves ad hoc.
5. Agency conflicts. The separation between ownership (share-
holders) and management (managers) generates the agency
conflict condition due to the asymmetric information. The
manager's need to withhold funds by taking advantage of in-
vestment opportunities that, in some cases, can be considered
too risky by the shareholders, impact the decision to distribute
profits (Myers, 1977). Moreover, shareholders are also in con-
flict with bondholders. The latter are creditors of the com-
5
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pany. Thus, bondholders could require managers to hold liq-
uid assets (reducing dividend payments) to protect themselves
against possible financial failure and from the risk of insolvency
(Jensen, 1986; Jensen and Meckling, 1976).
1.1.2 Miller and Modigliani's Theory: Criticism
Initially, both academia and the financial world were skeptical about
Miller and Modigliani's propositions because the prevailing theory
at the time was based on the concept that exists an optimal level
of debt per company. According to the static theory of the optimal
capital structure, the debt ratio is positively related to the return
on assets, given that the most profitable companies have a lower
risk of insolvency and are subject to a higher marginal tax rate than
companies with lower returns (DeAngelo and Masulis, 1980).
As a result, high-yield companies are stimulated to heavily use
the leverage mechanism, having a higher capacity to increase profits.
According to this theory, the role of payout policy is fundamental
in determining the value of a company. Indeed, the static theory of
the optimal capital structure presumes the existence of an optimal
dividend level and deviating from it affects the firm's market value.
Consequently, a company with an optimal level of debt will see the
value of its shares decrease both if the company pays a dividend too
low (since investors will adjust their portfolios in search of stocks
that generate more returns) and if the company pays a dividend too
high (since the company will have insufficient liquidity to finance its
investments).
Gordon (1959, 1963) with his bird in the hand theory explains the
existence of dividends by introducing the possibility that investors
prefer a positive return (the dividend) over an uncertain return in-
fluenced by market dynamics (increase in share prices). His model
provides the option for companies to keep a fraction of the profits
to finance new projects. This policy of reinvesting profits within
the company's business generates wealth which, possibly, will re-
flect in a higher value of shares on the market. However, risk-averse
6
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investors prefer regular dividend than the possibility of future cap-
ital returns. Thus, as a result of an increase in the percentage of
retained earnings, risk-averse investors demand a higher dividend
yield according to the Gordon model. However, Gordon's theory
does not allow companies to invest in projects with zero-net present
value (NPV). Rubinstein (1985) shows that retain earnings does not
generate any change in the value of the company if the possibility of
investing in zero-NPV projects is allowed. Thus, in line with Miller
and Modigliani, Bhattacharya (1979) states that a change in cash
flows riskiness may influence the dividend distribution policy, but in
any way, a dividend policy variation may influence the cash flows
riskiness and consequently the riskiness of the company. In the next
section, we specifically examine the effects of taxation and trans-
action costs on a company's payout policy, showing the prominent
models in the literature with the primary empirical evidence.
1.2 Dividends and Taxation
As anticipated, in the United States, Europe, and many other in-
dustrialized countries, the personal tax rate applied to capital gains
generated by the share sales is lower than the rate applied to the
dividend yield. The literature on corporate finance has, for a long
time, focused on the effects of the disparity in tax treatment be-
tween dividends and capital gains. Intuitively, if all investors are
subject to the same tax rate, then a rational investor should pre-
fer companies that do not pay dividends or that distribute small
dividends. Therefore, at the same conditions, firms that distribute
significant dividends should be penalized. However, throughout the
20th century, we observe that most companies regularly paid mas-
sive dividends and that the repurchase of shares was considered a
marginal payment instrument.
Miller and Modigliani (1961) suggest that different groups of in-
vestors (different clientele) are taxed at different rates. As a con-
sequence, there will be investors with higher tax rates which will
7
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prefer to invest in companies that do not pay dividends, and in-
vestors (whose portfolio is strongly oriented towards pension funds)
who are exempt from dividend taxes, therefore indifferent to the
dividend policy. In this context, each company should adjust its
payout policy to maximize shareholders' wealth by increasing the
share price. In equilibrium, companies cannot influence the stock
price by changing its dividend policy to attract a specific clientele
of investors. Therefore, it is possible to obtain the irrelevance of
dividend policies if the supply of dividends can fully satisfy the de-
mand and, at the same time, if investors can adjust their portfolios
quickly.
For the first time, Brennan (1971) develops a version of the
CAPM (capital asset pricing model) by introducing a personal tax
regime. The author shows that investors, with the same risk level,
require compensation on returns for firms that choose to distribute a
dividend, as a result of the tax regime that penalizes dividend income
over capital gains. To reconcile empirical observations with theory,
Brennan deduces that a real or perceived constraint must determine
the companies' behavior on share repurchases. He then includes in
his model a constraint on the share repurchase that constrains com-
panies to distribute the proceeds through dividends. Specifically, the
Brennan equation for the capital asset pricing model is as follows:
E(Rit −Rft) = a1 + a2βit + a3(dit −Rft) (1.1)
where E(Rit) represents the expected return for the company i at
time t, Rft is the risk-free interest rate for the period t, dit is the
dividend announced by the company i and βit represents its system-
atic risk. The Brennan model suggests that the coefficient a3 will
be positive and statistically significant to compensate for the higher
tax burden associated with the dividend.
Black and Scholes (1974) point out that it is complicated,
through cross-section analysis, to empirically demonstrate that the
expected returns of companies that distribute large dividends are
statistically higher than expected returns of firms that don't (both
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before and after individual taxation). Indeed, it is difficult to con-
trol for systematic risk and other factors, so observations cannot be
considered independent.
To test the Brennan model, Black and Scholes make some
changes to the equation (1.1) to get better estimates. The results
obtained do not allow them to determine whether the payout policy
affects share prices. Therefore, perplexity is expressed about the hy-
pothesis that the market requires higher returns to compensate for
the tax disadvantages of dividends.
Litzenberger and Ramaswamy (1980) extend the Brennan model
by including restrictions on shareholder borrowing and restrictions
on short selling. According to Brennan (1970, 1973), they find that
compensation for a higher dividend is positively correlated to the dif-
ference between the dividend rate and the capital gain rate. More-
over, their methodology of analysis differs significantly from that
used by Black and Scholes (1974). Indeed, Litzenberger and Ra-
maswamy (1980) analysis involves three steps to estimate the equa-
tion (1.1). The first step consists in the estimation of the beta of
each share contained in the sample through the following equation:
RiT −RfT = ait + βit(RmT −RfT ) + jT
with T = t− 60, .., t− 1 (1.2)
where Rmj is the return on a market portfolio proxy at the time
j, Rij is the return on the share i, Rfj is the risk-free interest rate,
and ij is the error term. Furthermore, the βit coefficient represents
the estimated beta for the share i at the time t. The second step
consists in estimating for all the months included in the analysis
the coefficient that measures the effect of the difference between the
expected dividend and the risk-free interest rate on the asset i risk
premium. In this regression the beta estimate for the security i
during the month t, βit, and the estimated expected dividend, dit is
used as control variable. The researchers to estimate the expected
dividend used the last dividend paid in the previous 12 months. In
the previous 12 months, the firm did not pay any dividend, then
9
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Litzenberger and Ramaswamy assume that the expected dividend is
equal to zero. The cross-section regression for the month t is given
by:
Rit −Rft = a1t + a2tβit + a3t(dit −Rft) + it (1.3)
So, thanks to this equation, Litzenberger and Ramaswamy get
an estimate of the historical series of a3t for the months from 1936
to 1977. The third and final step computes the a3 estimation of the
(1.1) equation. The coefficient value is calculated as the average of
the series of coefficients, a3t, estimated in the previous step.
The standard error in the estimate of a3 is determined by the
formula: σa3t/
√
t′ , where σa3t is the standard deviation of the his-
torical series a3t, and t
′
represents the number of months in the sam-
ple. The results of the Litzenberger and Ramaswamy's tests confirm
that dividends have a positive and statistically significant effect on
returns and interpret these results as evidence of the influence of
taxation on dividend policies.
Miller and Scholes (1982) argue that the relationship between
returns and dividends is affected by the various short-term mea-
sures of expected return on dividends, which may have undesirable
effects due to the possibility that the dividend provides to the mar-
ket information on future returns. Miller and Scholes criticize the
Litzenberger and Ramaswamy's methodology because it produces a
distorted estimation of the expected monthly dividends due to the
lack of data on dividend announcements. Managers do not always
announce the dividend, or sometimes they mislead by promising a
dividend that does not take place at the end of the financial year.
These announcements are bad news for the market, and they have
negative effects on the stock price.
Ultimately, it is complex to empirically demonstrate that the
shares expected returns that of firms that distribute high dividends
are statistically higher than the expected returns of shares that do
not pay dividends, both before and after personal taxation. They do
not find any significant relationship between share yields and divi-
dend payments, advancing perplexity over the hypothesis that the
10
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market requires higher yields to compensate for the tax disadvan-
tages of dividends.
Subsequently also Chen, Grundy, and Stambaugh (1990), Fama
and French (1993), and Kalay and Michaely (2000) underline se-
vere endogeneity problems (due to the strong correlation between
dividends and different risk factors) and serial correlation (due to
difficulties in estimating the expected dividend).
Fama (1998) seek to measure the effect of dividend taxation on
the value of the firm using equations that are not explicitly derived
from a theoretical model, but equations that exploit different ways
of expressing the firm's market value, dividends and interest on the
debt. The objective of this regression strategy is to control for the
influence of the company's growth opportunities on payment de-
cisions. Moreover, Fama and French also include in the equation
future values to absorb changes in investors' expectations. They
deduce, however, that it is very complex to control all the effects
of profitability on dividends and interest paid on debt through the
variables usually used in the literature. Indeed, the results on the
impact of taxation on dividends through a regression of returns are
not unique.
An approach that diverges from the theory of static clientele is
represented by the hypothesis of investors making dynamic invest-
ments.Miller and Scholes (1978) consider the possibility for investors
to implement dynamic trading strategies to reduce or eliminate the
taxation effect on securities returns. The basic idea is that an in-
vestor subject to a high tax rate on dividends will change his in-
vestment plans because of the day of the ex-dividend day. Following
the announcement of dividend payment, an investor that risks to
end up in a different tax bracket, he surely would like to avoid divi-
dend income so as not to be subject to a higher tax rate. Probably
he would sell his shares to investors who are exempt from dividend
tax. Therefore, it is assumed that investors subject to low rates buy
shares in the days before the ex-dividend day and resell them in the
following days, to earn on the price difference and on the dividend
itself. There is strong indirect evidence to support this theory. Un-
11
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fortunately, indirect evidence only, since it is tough to establish with
certainty the identity of the investors who trade the shares.
Rantapuska (2008) makes an interesting study based on data on
the choices of Finnish investors. He analyses the trading data-sets of
all investors in the Finnish stock market and demonstrates that low
taxed investors tend to buy shares before the coupon detachment,
whereas heavily taxed investors tend to sell before the stock pays
the dividend.
Poterba and Summers (1984) find that the average drop in share
prices between the announcement and the days immediately follow-
ing the dividend distribution is lower than the dividend amount and
also they notice that the average return on shares increases as the
dividend increases.
An interesting analysis of the abnormal increase in trading vol-
ume around ex-dividend date is provided by Michaely, Vila, and
Wang (1996). The increase in trading activity around these days
confirms the importance of dividend taxation.
Several studies use an analysis methodology based on the detec-
tion of the impact of sudden changes on the dividend income and
capital gains taxation to study their influence. This approach fo-
cuses on the effects of exogenous events on corporate distribution
policy and investor behavior. Typically, these analyses are limited
to the time horizon in which a new tax reform becomes effective. The
advantage of this strategy consists in the possibility of capturing the
impact of taxation by minimizing the influence of variables omitted
due to lack of data or the difficulty of isolating payment policy from
other unwanted dynamics (such as transaction costs and corporate
profitability).
Poterba and Summers (1984) analyze the effects of two major tax
reforms on the British market using both daily and monthly data.3
If taxes affect decisions to buy or sell shares on the ex-dividend day,
3They refer to the 1965 reform that introduced a dividend capital gain tax
of 30% and the 1973 reform that integrated the corporate income tax. These
reforms effectively reduced dividend income tax for private and corporate in-
vestors.
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then a change in the dividend tax regime should affect share prices.
As mentioned above, this approach makes it possible to overlook
the criticism of Miller and Scholes (1982) regarding the distortion
of the estimation of Litzenberger and Ramaswamy (1979). Indeed,
both the information effects" and the measurement problems will
be common to both tax systems. They conclude that, since the in-
crease in dividend taxes in 1913, the investors have been demanding
a higher return from companies paying dividends, confirming the
hypothesis of Brennan (1971) and Litzenberger's and Ramaswamy's
(1979) that taxation represents a significant part of the positive re-
lationship between dividends and stock yields.
Chetty and Saez (2005) take advantage of the reduction in the
maximum tax rate on dividends (effectively equating the rate on
dividends to the rate on capital gains) that took place in the U.S.A.
in 2003. They note that the reform has significantly contributed
to the increase in the number of companies distributing profits and
changing the dividend trend had in the previous decades.
However, Farre-Mensa, Michaely, and Schmalz (2014) criticize
Chetty and Saez's conclusions, and again, they denounce distorted
estimations because of the information effect. Specifically, Farre-
Mensa, Michaely, and Schmalz emphasize the possibility that man-
agers, anticipating the future tax reform, have decided to postpone
dividend payments until the period in which the reform would come
into force. The firms have therefore decided to delay the payment
of dividends to the period in which the reform would come into
force. The companies would, therefore, have chosen to defer pay-
ments to take advantage of the reduction in the maximum rate. In
this case, the effect of the tax reform obtained by Chetty and Saez
would be overestimated. Brav et al. (2008) confirm the hypothesis
that companies have only postponed the payment of dividends; as
they show that the number of companies paying dividends increases
significantly in the quarter following the reform and then returns to
pre-reform levels.
Summarizing, the results of cross-section analyses are particu-
larly ambiguous, as they do not definitively confirm the effect of
13
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taxation on share yields due to dividend payments. On the other
hand, the studies confirm an unusual behavior of the share price
and transaction volumes in the days following the announcement.
Consequently, it is possible to partially confirm a dynamic clientele
effect.4 (limited to days around the announcement and payment
of dividends) but conditioned by transaction costs that block trade
between investors subject to different tax rates5.
Several studies observe that transaction costs inhibits trades,
thus placing some limits on the assumptions of the clientele theory.
Indeed, by directly analyzing investors' portfolio preferences, several
studies suggest that investors subject to high taxation hold a stag-
gering number of shares in companies paying significant dividends,
thus weakening the hypothesis of the influence of tax on investors'
portfolios.6
1.3 Dividends and Asymmetric Informa-
tion
Several empirical analyses show that announcements of variations
in companies' dividend policies determine strong activities in stock
markets.7
4It is a theory that explains how a company's share price moves according
to the demands and objectives of investors in response to a tax, dividend or
other policy change. It assumes, first of all, that specific investors are attracted
to different corporate policies and that when the policy of a company changes,
investors adjust their shareholdings accordingly. As a result of this adjustment,
the share price moves upwards or downwards
5Michaely and Vila (1996) show that the volume of one-day transactions is
a decreasing function of transaction costs.
6Blume, Crockett, and Friend (1974) survey investors' portfolios. Lewellen,
Stanley, Lease, and Schlarbaum (1978) carry out analyses on the clientele of a
brokerage firm. Del Guercio (1996) notes that the portfolios are quite similar
when analyzing the composition of the portfolios of certain mutual funds (highly
taxed) and pension funds (exempt from taxation).
7See Michaely, Vila, and Wang (1996), Karpoff (1987), and Pettit (1972).
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Typically, the announcement of an increase in dividends is suc-
ceeded by an increase in the price of the shares; conversely, the
announcement of a cut in dividends is followed by a decrease. It
is, therefore, necessary to develop new models capable of explaining
the high payout ratio of listed companies and capture the dynamics
of the financial markets following the announcement of a change in
the payment of dividends.
This is how the theory of signals was born, as opposed to the
theory of Miller and Modigliani. This theory states that dividend
payments provide positive signals about the company's prospects for
stability and growth. Most models in the signaling theory assume
that managers have more information (about the profitability of the
company) than other market agents.
Bhattacharya (1979) adopts a two-period model where the man-
ager maximizes the value of the company. This model links man-
ager's compensation to the company's profits to recreate a context
in which the interests of shareholders and managers are perfectly
aligned. However, the manager alone observes the profitability of
the investment, and he decides whether to implement a project. In-
vestors do not observe the expected return of the investment. How-
ever they observe the dividend that the manager pays and decide
whether to invest in the company. Basically, the manager signals
the profitability of the project through the payout policy promised
for the next period. If the profit generated in the first period is in-
sufficient to cover the promised dividend, then the manager will be
forced to recourse to external funding and bear the related transac-
tion costs to cover the promised dividend. The dividend is instead
directly paid if the profit made at the beginning of period 1 is greater
than or equal to the promised dividend. Bhattacharya shows that in
equilibrium managers of companies with low expected returns will
not find it convenient to promise a high dividend otherwise they
would be forced to continuously resort to external financing, and
consequently to incur high transaction costs.
Miller and Rock (1985) also develop a two-period model with
correlated profits. Through a framework very similar to the one used
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by Bhattacharya, the researches assume that to give positive signals
to the market managers have the possibility of reducing investments
and increasing dividends. So they introduce the hypothesis that the
distortion occurs in the investment policies of a company, rather
than in the choices of financing as previously assumed.
However, both models do not take into account share repurchases
and specifically the different tax treatment of repurchases and divi-
dends.
The model of John andWilliams (1985), on the other hand, intro-
duces the possibility for firms to repurchase their shares, reproducing
a differentiated tax treatment between dividends and repurchases.
In particular, repurchases are not taxed, so they are a more advan-
tageous means of repaying shareholders. However, companies that
choose to distribute a dividend despite the tax disadvantage signal
that the price of their shares is undervalued, causing an increase.
John and Williams assume that the managers are the only who
know the real value of the stocks. Moreover, they assume that some
shareholder is forced to sell a portion of its shares to satisfy liquidity
needs. They show that in equilibrium, only managers of underval-
ued companies have an incentive to pay dividends. In fact, for these
companies, the increase in the share price due to the payment of
dividends will be sufficient to offset the cost of taxes. However, this
model does not provide shareholders the access to external financ-
ing to satisfy their liquidity needs. Indeed, through external funding,
shareholders could satisfy their liquidity needs without being con-
strained to sell shares.
The tendency of companies to gradually adjust their dividend
payments is one of the limitations of the signal theory.
The classic signaling models (Bhattacharya, 1979; John and
Williams, 1985; Miller and Rock, 1985), are not suitable to explain
the gradual adjustment of dividends. This is because only two kinds
of equilibrium are assumed:
1. an equilibrium in which dividends completely reveal the pri-
vate information of the manager (complete separating equilib-
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ria);
2. an equilibrium in which dividends do not reveal any informa-
tion (complete pooling equilibria).
Kumar (1988) and Guttman, Kadan, and Kandel (2010) instead
develop models based on the signal theory that explain the gradual
adjustment of dividends.
Assuming that the manager's return is decreasing respect to the
shareholders' investment, Kumar shows the existence of a equilib-
rium of partial signaling where the bad managers may not have
the convenience of paying a dividend equal to that distributed by
the good managers to not risk over-investment by the sharehold-
ers. He shows that the policy of dividend payment in equilibrium
is represented by a step function with respect to the productivity
of the manager. In practice, all managers on the same partition
will pay the same dividend. This element characterizes the gradual
adjustment of dividends.
Guttman, Kadan, and Kandel differently elaborate a model
where the gradual adjustment of dividends derives from managers'
willingness to keep dividends stable until revenues change signifi-
cantly. An equilibrium is reached in which for intermediate levels
of revenues managers pay the same dividend, for levels of revenues
outside this range (therefore particularly high or low) there is a com-
plete disclosure of the private information of the manager.
Allen, Bernardo, and Welch (2000) make an interesting contri-
bution to signal theory. In their model, dividends are a useful signal
to attract more informed investors. According to their assumptions,
companies with good growth prospects for undervalued equity mar-
kets try to attract large financial institutions (such as investment
funds) that can monitor the potential of a company and the perfor-
mance of managers. On the contrary, firms that are overvalued with
little investment opportunity have no incentive to have institutions
among their shareholders that can measure the real value of the firm.
Moreover, once institutional investors have been attracted, they can
impose a large sanction in response to dividend cuts, so managers
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are forced to offset dividends. Therefore, distributing dividends al-
lows managers of undervalued companies to report the real value
and generate an increase in the shares' price. This hypothesis is in
line with the clientele theory described in the previous section and
with the widespread practice of gradual adjustment of dividends (in
fact, in such a context the reduction of dividends would send the
opposite signal).
The examined models assume that the manager considers his
own company undervalued and therefore sends positive signals to
the markets about the expected return of the company through the
payout policy.
1.3.1 Signaling Theory
The assumptions and conclusions described in the previous section
can be tested through empirical analyses. The main predictions of
the dividend signaling model concern a:
1. positive relationship between changes in dividends and the re-
action of prices to changes in dividends;
2. positive relationship between the change in dividends and the
future earnings of companies;
3. positive relationship between the changes in dividends and the
profit forecasts of the company's analysts.
However, the empirical analyses developed so far have not been
able to confirm the relationships predicted by the models.
Recent studies evaluate the possibility that the dividend will send
signals about the company's risk rather than the expected return.
Consequently, changes in dividend policy would be interpreted as
changes in the volatility of returns rather than changes in the ex-
pected value of future cash flows.
Grullon, Michaely, and Swaminathan (2002) develop the so-
called theory of the "firms maturity". This theory is rooted in a
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recurrent concept in business management and administration man-
uals according to which companies go through several stages during
their life cycle, following a maturation process. According to Grul-
lon, Michaely, and Swaminathan, when a company matures, there
are two effects: it benefits from the reduction of systematic risk, but
at the same time it suffers from a reduction of investment opportu-
nities.
In this context, researchers claim that an increase in the dividend
is a positive sign, first of all, because the markets may not be aware
of the reduction in the company's risk, and then the increase in the
dividend would be a positive surprise. Besides, since the greater the
maturity of the company corresponds to a greater shortage of posi-
tive net present value projects, according to Grullon, Michaely and
Swaminathan the markets appreciate that the manager, rather than
burning resources in bad investment projects, increases payments
to shareholders. Therefore, the market reacts positively for agency
reasons, as proposed in Jensen (1986) and Stulz (1990).
1.3.2 Agency Theory
Simplifying, we can define a firm as a complex structure of contrac-
tual agreements between different actors (i.e., shareholders, man-
agers, employees, and bondholders). The economic literature has
long addressed the issue of conflicting interests between the com-
pany management and control. In this framework, the dividend
policy can be framed as one of the tools to balance the complicated
relationships between the various actors. The investigations focused
mainly on two conflicts of interest: the bondholder-shareholder and
the manager-shareholder conflict. We start by illustrating the dy-
namics of the conflict between bondholders and shareholders and
the associated empirical literature.
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Agency Theory: the Bondholders-Shareholders Conflict
The nature of the conflict between bondholders and shareholders
derives from the substantial asymmetry in their payoff profiles. In-
deed, in case the cash flow generated by the economic activity is not
sufficient to repay the debt, bondholders have the right to take over
the company's assets to offset (at least partially) their claim on the
company. Therefore, bondholders usually solicit managers to have a
behavior aimed at minimizing the default risk. On the other hand,
the shareholders' payoff is given by the difference between revenues
and debt. Therefore, the shareholders would like to make the dif-
ference between revenues and payments to bondholders as large as
possible, at the cost of undermining the business solvency.
The conflict of interest between shareholders and bondholders
influences the firm's payout policy. The manager can draw away
resources from the bondholders' disposal through dividend payouts.
Consequently, unexpected dividend payments can virtually increase
the company insolvency risk and thus reduce the value of the debt.
However, generally, bondholders impose restrictions on dividend
payments.
Kalay (1982) examines a sample of stock contracts, specifically
focusing on lenders restrictions imposed on dividend payout. These
constraints can be either direct or indirect. Direct restrictions place
limits on dividend payment and share repurchases over the life of
the bond. Indirect constraints, on the other hand, essentially place
restrictions on some balance-sheet items (i.e., requiring a minimum
amount for equity or working capital, or else a maximum level for
the debt to asset ratio). Usually, indirect constraints are much more
powerful than direct constraints because once violated; they force
shareholders to contribute with new capital or to lose shares. Ac-
cording to Kalay, the nature of the restrictions supports the assump-
tion that dividends represent a tool to limit the conflict of interest
between shareholders and bondholders.
Successive studies analyze the effect of an unexpected change in
dividends on shares and stock prices. Consistently with the agency
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theory, an unexpected dividend increase should cause an increase
in share price and at the same time, a reduction in bond price.
However, if the increase in dividends indicates an increase in the
company's growth opportunities, then it is plausible to think that
an unexpected increase in dividend payout should also be consid-
ered as good news for bondholders. The main obstacle for this kind
of analysis is given by the isolation of the effect of the payout pol-
icy variation, keeping constant all other variables. Handjinicolaou
and Kalay (1984), Jayaraman and Shastri (1988), and Dhillon and
Johnson (1994) confirm that the behavior of bond and equity prices
concerning significant changes in dividends is consistent with the
agency hypothesis.
Agency Theory: the Manager-Shareholders Conflict
The managers-shareholders conflict (as for the bondholders-
shareholders conflict) stems from the divergence between their objec-
tive functions. This discrepancy becomes heavier as the dispersion
of the shares' ownership increases. Essentially, the more the owner-
ship is shared by a large number of shareholders the more expensive
it will be for a single shareholder to monitor the manager perfor-
mance since the benefits will be equally distributed among the all
the shareholders.
Also, shareholders have the opportunity to diversify their port-
folio. Therefore they are exposed to systematic/un-diversifiable risk
only. Conversely, the manager compensation and prestige crucially
depend on the success of the company. Indeed, the manager can-
not diversify the insolvency or bankruptcy risk. Thus, the manager
risk-aversion could be quite relevant for the firm investment policy
(e.g., a risk-oriented manager may prefer a short-term view threaten-
ing the long-term profitability and stability of the company, Jensen
and Meckling (1976)). Once again, the agency conflict increases as
many outside security holders (i.e., shareholders who do not have
management tasks) are involved in the company ownership.
Therefore, the asymmetry between the managers and sharehold-
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ers' returns affects the company's dividend policy. Indeed, the di-
vergences between the managers and shareholders' objectives could
induce the former to accumulate liquid assets to obtain greater dis-
cretion on the operational choices of the company, and the latter to
put constraints on the management to avoid behaviors that would
risk burning the company's liquidity. It is complex to assess whether
the manager's choices are not maximizing the firm's value. There-
fore, very often, the shareholders use remuneration contracts to align
their interests with those of the managers. Stock options are an
example of managers' remuneration designed to alleviate manager-
shareholders conflict. Indeed, the stock options give the manager the
right to buy the company's shares at a predetermined price (strike
price). However, stock options negatively affect dividend payments
also. Indeed, in perfect capital markets, the shares' price is reduced
by an amount equal to the dividend. As a result, managers are en-
couraged to reduce or avoid dividend payments until they have the
opportunity to exercise the stock option.
Easterbrook (1984) argues that dividends mitigate shareholders'
monitoring costs. The researcher assumes that shareholders expect
dividends to be distributed so that the manager is forced to raise ex-
ternal funds to finance new investment projects. Thus, shareholders
prefer a certain debt level because the bondholders, such as invest-
ment banks and funds, provide further control over the management.
Dividend payments allow shareholders to externalize monitoring,
thus reducing agency costs. Therefore, we expect that companies
with dispersed shareholding ownership and high debt-to-equity ra-
tio, payout a constant level of dividends. On the contrary, compa-
nies with a single large shareholder, who has a strong incentive to
monitor the manager's choices, will pay little or no dividends. East-
erbrook's model is also compatible with the evidence on companies
that pay dividends and, at the same time, raise capital by issuing
bonds on capital markets. Several studies confirm the Easterbrook
hypothesis and note that shareholders impose dividend payments to
reduce the free cash flows available to the manager and to prevent
sub-optimal investments (e.g., investing in unprofitable acquisitions
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and/or mergers).
Numerous empirical analyses confirm the influence of agency
problems on payment policy. Lang, Stulz, and Walkling (1989) and
later Yoon and Starks (1995) report that the shares' prices in compa-
nies with poor investment opportunities are much more sensitive to
changes in payout policy than companies with better growth oppor-
tunities. This result confirms the importance of the dividend policy
in resolving conflicts of interest, which are particularly relevant in
the case of companies with low investment opportunities.
Lambert, Lanen, and Larcker (1989) examine agency conflicts
by analyzing the connections between manager compensation and
payout policy. The researchers find that most of the managers' re-
muneration is aligned with shareholders goal; fewer dividends are
paid. Indeed, Eckbo and Verma (1994) and Agrawal and Narayanan
(1994) find that the managers with greater control over the company
make lower cash payments to shareholders.
La Porta et al. (2000a) exploit countries variation in sharehold-
ers protection laws. They find that higher shareholders protection
increases the probability to pay out dividends, in particular for firms
with low investment opportunities.
1.4 Dividends and Transaction Costs
A method for classifying financial markets refers to the measurement
of transaction costs. The level of transaction costs can influence the
investors' trading choices.
It is possible that investors would opt for stocks of companies
that do not pay dividends to avoid the transaction costs associated
with the dividend reinvestment. Conversely, investors who want to
periodically obtain a specific return from their capital investments
(e.g., to finance their consumption) may prefer shares that pay div-
idends.
Hence, companies could exploit investors preferences to enhance
their market value. However, as suggested by Black and Scholes
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(1974), in equilibrium the firms will adjust their payout policy such
that the marginal investor would be indifferent to the level of divi-
dend paid. Moreover, Allen and Michaely (2003) register a signifi-
cant reduction of small investors on the financial markets, but the
size of aggregate dividends has not changed significantly.
Rozeff (1982) investigates on the relationship between dividend
policy, agency costs, and transaction costs. Rozeff assumes that
an increase in dividend payout ratio (keeping constant the profit)
reduces agency costs but increases transaction costs related to ex-
ternal financing.8 The optimal dividend level is the result of the
minimization of the cost. Rozeff's model is based on the trade-off
theory of optimal capital structure.9 According to this theory at the
end of each period managers compare costs and benefits of holding
liquid assets; consequently, the optimal liquidity level is given by the
amount of cash flow that equates the marginal cost and the marginal
revenue. Specifically, the cost is given by the opportunity cost linked
to investments with the same degree of risk; the benefit instead is
given by the possibility to avoid financial constraints.10 The trade-
off theory forecasts a negative relationship between dividends and
the level of external financing. Essentially, it assumes that heavily
indebted companies with high volatile yields (e.g., growing young
companies)11 do not distribute dividends to avoid high transaction
costs associated with external funds acquisition.
Del Guercio (1996) estimates the impact of transaction costs on
the portfolio composition of some institutional investors. Exploiting
a reform on the U.S. securities market aimed at reducing transaction
costs for small investors, Del Guercio concludes that dividends do
not affect the portfolio composition of the mutual funds observed.
8Transaction costs associated with external funding are given by subscription
fees, administration costs, management time, and legal fees.
9Initially proposed by Kraus and Litzenberger (1973)
10Ferreira and Vilela (2004).
11Dempsey and Laber (1992) and Moh'd, Perry, and Rimbey (1995).
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1.5 Pecking Order Theory
Myers (1984) develops an alternative capital structure theory to
trade-off theory. Basically, the model (called the hierarchical model
of financing decisions or simply the pecking order) assumes a resid-
ual role of dividends about the investment needs of the company.
Meyers assumes that transaction costs and costs arising from
information asymmetries between managers and investors about
prospects and the value of the company determine a hierarchical
order between sources of finance. In this context, capital increases
through the issuance of new shares are the most expensive source
of financing. Intuitively, if a manager predicts an increase in future
earnings, shareholders should not be willing to share higher earnings
with new investors. Consequently, the issue of new securities is in-
terpreted by the market as a desire to share more risks and investors;
therefore, suffer from the problem of asymmetric information on the
price of new shares issued. In some cases, managers may even be
forced to abandon profitable investment projects because of the cost
of information asymmetries. Therefore, firms are forced to finance
their projects mainly through retained earnings, that is considered
the source of financing with the lowest cost. Only when the liquid
assets are exhausted companies ask for new debt, and ultimately
choose to issue new shares.
Meyers assumes that payout policies are strongly influenced by
considerations on the hierarchical order of financing decisions. The
model's predictions imply that companies that expect to make large
investments with extremely volatile returns and companies with high
leverage avoid paying dividends.
Fama and French (2002) for the first time compare trade-off the-
ory with the pecking order theory, and they find that data support
many of the predictions of both models. The results confirm the re-
lationship between profitability and the use of leverage in a company.
The trade-off theory predicts that the most profitable companies will
make greater use of the possibilities of external funding, but the test
results do not support this hypothesis. Fama and French also find
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that companies paying dividends make significantly fewer equity is-
sues. Moreover, Fama and French find that among the companies
that distribute dividends, the small and quickly growing companies
are those that make the most use of the issuance of new securities,
contrary to the theory of hierarchical order. Ultimately, Fama and
French find that the results do not fully support either theory.
1.6 Empirical Evidence
The empirical analysis of the dividend policy is made incredibly
complicated by the strong simultaneity in the manager's decisions.
Indeed, in the empirical corporate finance, it is unlikely that an
econometrician observes reasonable exogenous variation in a vari-
able. Furthermore, the scarcity of data does not make it possible
to extend the results from the sample to the population, without
generating strong doubts about the stability of the results obtained.
Indeed, researchers are continually looking for new data-sets that
give the possibility to extrapolate more information about investors'
and managers preferences.
Black and Scholes (1974), in their famous article "The Effects of
Dividend Yield and Dividend Policy on Common Stock Prices and
Returns", wrote:
There have been many attempts in recent years to verify whether
or not the payout policy of a firm affects the price of its shares,
but these tests have never been sufficiently satisfactory. Most of the
authors used sampling-based tests of companies, which attempt to
compare the share prices of companies that differ only in dividend
policy. A problem with such tests is that it is very difficult to control
variables other than payout policy, and it is tough to obtain accurate
estimates of the meaning of the results obtained from regressions
based on sampling. It is challenging to say whether a relationship
found in a regression represents a causal relationship, and if so, in
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which direction does the randomness run.
The constant search for precise identification, a ceteris paribus
comparison, has led academic literature to analyze in isolation the
choices on dividends and repurchases concerning all other moments
of the life of a company. Indeed, the analysis method most widely
adopted in the literature on dividend payout policy is the quasi-
experimental approach. In these applications, economists are inter-
ested in the effects of structural government interventions on shares
price and dividend variables. These studies aim to isolate the impact
of payout policy on financing and investment choices.
However, despite the considerable difficulties, has been made sig-
nificant progress in the empirical analysis on the effects of payment
policy on firms' value. Below we summarize the main results ob-
tained in the literature. In the next section, we start by assessing
the quantitative incidence of payments, and we continue by high-
lighting the main features of dividends and repurchases.
1.6.1 Evidence on Aggregated Data
Until the early 80s, dividends were the main mean of payment, and
share repurchases was a marginal phenomenon. However, Skinner
(2008) shows that in the last decades, the number of buybacks ex-
ceeded the companies' dividend payments, becoming the dominant
form of payment. Grullon, Michaely, and Swaminathan (2002), ob-
serve that the noticeable increase in repurchases is a sign of the regu-
lar dividends replacement. The proportion of companies distributing
dividends on the total number of listed companies has progressively
decreased from 80s to the early years of the new century. Until the
early 2000s, empirical studies tried to discern the reasons for the
observed payment patterns by focusing mainly on the effect of tax-
ation, agency costs, and signaling. Fama and French (2001) show
that one of the main reasons for the fall in dividends is the explo-
sion in the number of small companies with low profitability (e.g.,
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all dot-com listed firms in the 90s linked to the internet expansion).
New theories consider the managers' remuneration as the main
reason for the dizzying growth in the use of share repurchase as
shareholders payment method. Specifically, Young and Yang (2011)
note that managers' compensation is very often linked to earnings
per share (EPS), i.e., managers are rewarded as this measure in-
creases. Since this ratio increases as the number of outstanding
shares decreases, managers are inclined to prefer to share repurchase
rather than pay out dividends. Researchers find strong evidence to
support these assumptions.
At the same time, the reduction in the proportion of companies
that distribute dividends has been followed by a substantial increase
in the amount of the dividends paid by companies that distributed
higher dividends in previous years.
However, in the last decade we observe a trend reversal.12 There
has been an increase in the number of (U.S. and European) listed
companies distributing dividends. This evidence suggests that man-
agers consider dividends and share repurchase as complementary
methods.
1.6.2 Evidence on Firm-level Data
Lintner (1956) conducts the first survey on payout policies in 1956,
which was aimed at managers of major U.S. listed companies. An-
alyzing the surveys from 28 selected firms, Lintner finds that for
most managers, the stability of payout policy is a priority, even over
investment policy. He notes that a large percentage of managers pre-
fer to increase debt rather than cut dividend payments to finance an
investment.
According to this survey, the main objective for managers is to
ensure the payout stability of shareholders compensations. However,
in case a change in dividend policy is deemed necessary, Lintner
shows that the entity of the variation in payments is decided based
12Floyd, Li, and Skinner (2015) document this new upsurge for dividends.
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on the variation in profits.
Based on the results of the study, Lintner elaborates an equation
that captures the behavior underlying the payout policy of a generic
firm i:
∆Dit = ai + ci(D
∗
it −Di(t−1)) + uit with D∗it = riPit,
where Pit represents the after-tax profit during the period, and
r represents the percentage of profit that the manager would like
to pay its shareholders. The parameter c represents the rate with
which managers change their payout policy, taking into account the
dividend paid in the previous year. Lintner tests this model and
confirms the assumptions and shows that this equation can capture
the 85% of the variations in payout policies in the sample.
Baker, Powell, and Weaver (1999) conduct a very similar anal-
ysis through a survey on managers of the major companies listed
on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) in 1997. Their results
confirm Lintner's findings. According to Baker and Powell, past,
current, and expected profits prove to be the variables that most
influence managers' payment decisions. Besides, researchers observe
that company managers are incredibly aware that investors interpret
payout policy corrections as changes in the company's profitability.
Moreover, Baker and Powell find that managers avoid increasing
dividends, and consequently alter the dividend to profit ratio when
they predict that the increase will not be sustainable in subsequent
periods.
Brav et al. (2005) conduct further survey interviewing financial
executives and obtaining their thought on payment policy choices.
They also confirm Lintner's central finding, i.e., managers primar-
ily pursue a stable payment policy. The survey also confirms the
underlying assumption of both signaling models (Miller and Rock,
1985) and agency models (Jensen, 1986) that managers are willing to
give up positive net present value investment projects before cutting
dividends. It is clear from the survey that dividend payments are ex-
tremely binding on managers, with more than 65% of the managers
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surveyed saying that they are also willing to use funds outside the
company to avoid dividend reductions. Also, around 80% of finan-
cial executives agree that dividends provide information to investors.
According to the managers, the information transmitted through the
payment of the dividend is not intended to attract a particular class
of investors (as assumed by the clientele theory) or the level of fu-
ture returns (as described by the theory of signal).13 Rather, some
managers argue that the transmitted information affects the volatil-
ity of returns and specifically the systematic risk associated with
the company. Brav, Graham, Harvey, and Michaely also point out
that share repurchases transmit almost the same information as div-
idends. However, the analysis of the survey shows that managers do
not consider buyback plans as binding as dividend payment plans.
It appears that managers are not willing to increase external debt
or equity, nor to give up investment projects to finance repurchases.
This distinctive element between the two payment methods would
confirm that buybacks and dividends cannot be regarded as perfect
substitutes (as noted by Grullon and Michaely, 2002).
All over the world, firms that distribute dividends exhibit simi-
lar dynamics. The propensity to pay dividends is higher among the
largest and relatively stable firms, as well as among companies for
which retained earnings constitute a larger fraction of the total cap-
ital and with low growth rates. The increase in dividends recorded
since the early years of the new century is mainly due to large com-
panies that liquidate substantial dividend amounts. In fact, through
an analysis conducted on 15 member nations of the European Union
from 1989 to 2005, von Eije and Megginson (2006) show that the
number of listed companies that pay dividends is steadily decreased,
despite the overall dividends have increased. Also in Europe, as in
the case of US companies, repurchases increased significantly from
17% of total payments in 1989 to 35% in 2005.
DeAngelo, De Angelo, and Stulz (2004) study the dividend poli-
cies using an approach based on the theory of optimal capital struc-
13Grullon and Michaely (2004) find a similar result for buybacks.
30
1.6. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
ture that assumes an optimal dividend level based on the specific
characteristics of a company. The researchers hypothesize that com-
panies with a high ratio between retained earnings and total capital
are mature companies, able to set aside profits and distribute the
optimal level of dividend, not suffering the distorting effects of mar-
ket frictions, such as agency conflicts, transaction costs, asymmetric
information, etc. According to this theory, they focus on the char-
acteristics of the companies that distribute dividends, presuming
that the companies that generate more profits are also those most
likely to borrow to obtain the maximum profit in favorable market
conditions. However, Baskin (1989) reports a negative relationship
between the profitability ratios and the debt ratios of a company,
confirming the mixed empirical evidence about the relationship be-
tween profits, debt, and dividends.
Booth and Cleary (2006) empirically analyze the connection be-
tween the presence of information asymmetries and the propensity of
managers to gradually adjust dividends. They find that companies
with a bond rating pay dividends following Lintner's rule. On the
contrary, firms without a bond rating that rely exclusively on pri-
vate (banking) debt do not make gradual adjustments to dividends
and seem to follow a residual payout policy compared to investment
policy. Leary and Michaely (2011) show that more mature com-
panies with low revenue volatility have a lower dividend variability.
The researchers conclude that the gradual adjustment of dividends is
negatively correlated with information asymmetry indices. Indeed
they find that firms with more financial analysts and consultants
have a higher propensity to dividend smoothing.
Michaely and Roberts (2011), on the other hand, hypothesize
that agency conflicts influence dividend smoothing. The researchers
conducted an interesting analysis of private companies where the
firm's ownership is highly concentrated, so the conflicts between
ownership and control are minimized. In these firms, Michaely and
Roberts note that the choice of the number of dividends is residual
concerning investment and financing policies. Furthermore, the re-
searchers observe that unlisted companies have a significantly lower
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probability of reducing dividends, and consequently, the gradual ad-
justment of dividends does not seem to be a priority for these com-
panies. These results confirm the influence of agency costs on com-
panies' payout policies. However, Michaely and Roberts stress that
agency costs cannot fully explain the practice of gradual adjustment
of dividends.
Dividends and Cash Holdings
Several empirical studies carry out analysis of the increasing secular
trend of cash and cash equivalents (Bates, Kahle, and Stulz, 2009;
Opler et al., 1999; Ozkan and Ozkan, 2004). Studying the balance-
sheets of U.S. companies, they identify four main causes for the
increase in cash holdings:
• a substantial increase in expenses for research and develop-
ment;
• superior management and consequently a reduction in unused
cash;
• a reduction in investment in fixed assets;
• an increase in cash flow risk.
Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (2006), estimate the effect of
agency costs on the firm's value. In practice, they assume that
the market value of cash holdings is greater in countries with a fi-
nancial system strongly oriented towards the protection of minority
shareholders. Therefore the controlling shareholders have a lower
possibility to obtain personal benefits from the management of liq-
uidity. For all the years examined, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson
divide the sample to the median country's protection level. The au-
thors find that the relationship between cash holdings and market
value is much weaker in countries with poor regulation on minority
shareholders' protection. Moreover, as evidence of the influence of
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agency costs, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson find that the rela-
tionship between dividends and the value of the company is weaker
in countries with strong shareholder protection. Therefore they con-
clude that agency costs have a strong impact on firms' value.
Pinkowitz and Williamson (2007) estimate the market value of a
unit of firms' liquid assets. Employing a sample of 13,000 U.S. com-
panies observed from 1965 to 2004, they try to determine the actual
value attributed to cash holdings by investors. Through their analy-
sis, they find a wide variety in the way firms evaluate a marginal dol-
lar of liquid assets. The valuation ranges from 0$ to 1.60$ depending
on company's characteristics and industry in which it operates.
If the real expected rate of return necessary for a company is
constant, then its intrinsic value per share at time t, V (t), is defined
as the present value of the company's expected future real cash flows
that will be available to be distributed for each share currently is-
sued. Given the well-known accounting identity. It follows that a
company's payout policy must necessarily satisfy the following equa-
tion:
V (t) = Et
[ ∞∑
k=0
D(t+ k)
(1 + r)k+1
]
Although the manager can influence the intrinsic value of his
company through his investment decisions, he cannot control the
stochastic process or unexpected deviations of V (t). However, the
manager has control over the dividends paid by the company under
the constraint described above.
This constraint is very similar to the inter-temporal budget con-
straint on rational consumption choices in the problem of consump-
tion choices over the lifetime of an individual. In this analogy, the
intrinsic value of an enterprise, V (t), corresponds to the permanent
income or wealth of the individual, and the payout policy of the
enterprise corresponds to the consumption policy of the individual.
Just as there is an infinite number of rational consumption plans
that satisfy the consumer's budget constraint for a given amount
of wealth, so there is an endless number of dividend policies that
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satisfy the constraint for a given intrinsic value of the enterprise.14
As previously seen, the choices relating to the financial policy of
a company are extremely interconnected and, at the same time, they
are not immune to changes in the internal equilibrium of the share-
holder structure. Information asymmetries represent the reason for
the synchronous among mutual influences. Debt, dividend policies,
and changes in private ownership are all tools used to reduce asym-
metric information; but these tools involve costs. Indeed, managers
who want to increase control incur in costs resulting from the mis-
diversification of their portfolio. At the same time, debt reduces free
cash flows under the control of the manager, but it generates new
conflicts between creditors and shareholders. Similarly, a reduction
in dividends may favor creditors at the cost of diverting resources
from shareholders, whereas an increase in dividends may reduce in-
formation asymmetries at the cost of diverting liquid resources from
managers.15
Dividends and Earnings' Volatility
As noted in previous sections, according to the complete market's
assumption, the dividend payment should generate a decrease in
share value equal to the amount of the dividend. Moreover, if a
company decides not to distribute dividends from one year to the
next, we should not observe any market reaction.
However, an unexpected dividend increase leads to a rise in
shares price and, conversely, an unexpected dividend cut generates
a sharp fall in shares price (Michaely, Thaler, and Womack, 1995a).
Moreover, Healy and Palepu (1988) show that market reactions are
more intense for companies that for the first time announce to dis-
tribute a dividend or for companies that, from one year to the next
one, decide to omit dividend payment.
Grullon and Michaely (2004) also note that the reaction of the
market is proportional to the entity of the variation in dividends
14Mash and Merton, (1986).
15See Jensen, Solberg, and Zorn (1992).
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or share repurchases. Indeed, more the dividend differs from the
expected one, stronger the impact on the share price.
According to Fama and Babiak (1968), earnings' volatility is
higher than dividends' volatility. This observation is supported by
numerous analyses that demonstrate the aversion of managers to
modify the payout policy.
Conversely, several studies show that share repurchases are
highly pro-cyclical and that a variation in repurchase policy has no
consequences on shares price.Lee and Rui (2007), through a struc-
tural vector autoregressive analysis, show that share repurchases
are associated with transitory increases in profits, whereas divi-
dends are related to the maturity of a company and are therefore
used to distribute the gains considered stable over time. Jagan-
nathan, Stephens, and Weisbach (2000) confirm that repurchases
are more flexible than dividends. They show that more than 70
percent listed companies do not complete the announced repurchase
program, moreover these firms do not suffer any significant market
disadvantage.
In summary, dividends indicate the company's past performance,
but its trend is not able to signal future profitability, as predicted
by signaling theory (Benartzi, Michaely, and Thaler, 1997).
However, Rozeff (1982) notes that firms that increase dividends
show a significant decrease in systematic risk, vice versa firms that
reduce dividends suffer a significant increase in systematic risk. Be-
sides, Rozeff notes an improvement in bond ratings and a reduction
in short-term investments and cash holdings for companies that in-
crease dividends. In line with these results, Grullon, Michaely, and
Swaminathan (2002) find a significant relationship between the pay-
out policy and the systematic risk of a company. They suppose
that the variation in returns following the announcement of divi-
dend payment may be associated with variation in the company's
risk profile. Indeed, they find that variations in returns linked to an-
nouncements of dividend payment that persist over the long term are
negatively correlated with future variation in systematic risk. There-
fore, they conclude that dividend payments facilitate investors, who
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learn about the variation in a company's risk profile only gradually,
in equity pricing.
These results suggest the existence of firms' transition from a
phase of sustained growth to a phase of low growth. The maturity
theory, also called life-cycle theory,16 defines a negative relationship
between the profitability of a company and dividends. According
to this theory, firms in an expansionary phase with strong invest-
ment opportunities, tend to take advantage of periods of growth and
therefore, consider profits as necessary resources to increase invest-
ment and thus achieve higher revenues. On the contrary, mature
companies face a decline in investment opportunities, a reduction
in systematic risk and, consequently, greater availability of liquid
resources that can be used to pay out dividends.
According to the life-cycle theory of dividends, DeAngelo, DeAn-
gelo, and Stulz (2006) define mature companies as those capable
of self-financing, i.e., with a high ratio of retained earnings to eq-
uity. They test the existence of firm's life-cycles examining the re-
lationship between the payout policy and the degree of maturity of
the company and find a positive statistically significant relationship,
consistent with life-cycle theory. Systematic risk, therefore, plays an
important role in the definition of payout policy.
According to Venkatesh (1989), a firm's specific risk component
also affects the volatility of the firm's payments, especially if dis-
tributes dividends for the first time. In line, Grullon and Michaely
(2012) discover the existence of an inverse relationship between the
level of competition in the sector in which the company operates and
the payout policy. They find that companies in sectors with a lower
degree of competition (i.e., low idiosyncratic risk) exhibit a lower
probability of increasing dividends.
So, we can conclude that both systematic and specific risk in-
fluence the payout policy, specifically an increase in dividends will
result in a reduction in business risk and vice versa.
16Mueller (1972).
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1.7 Conclusion
This chapter aims to provide an overview of the different strands of
critical theories formulated to explain the payout policy. However,
any theory nor empirical analysis completely explain the features
of the optimal payout policy. The results of the empirical analysis
are inconclusive, mixed, or contradictory. Frankfurter and Wood Jr
(1997) observes that:
Dividend-payment patterns (or what is often referred to as pay-
out policy") of firms are a cultural phenomenon, influenced by cus-
toms, beliefs, regulations, public opinion, perceptions and hysteria,
general economic conditions and several other factors, all in con-
stant change, impacting different firms differently. Accordingly, it
cannot be modeled mathematically and uniformly for all firms at all
times.
This is the starting point for the next chapter. We develop an
optimal payout policy model by considering all the previous results
and paradigms to identify the relevant factors that collectively de-
termine the manager's payout decisions.
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Chapter 2
Dynamic Discrete Choice
Model
Our goal in this chapter is to understand the behavioral process
that leads to the managers' choices. We begin by establishing the
bases of stochastic discrete choice dynamic programming models,
such as to formulate a parametric specification of the utility function
of a generic manager who must choose the optimal dividend policy.
Ultimately we conduct a counterfactual analysis to study the effects
deriving from the introduction of a subsidy on retained earnings, the
so called allowances for corporate equity.
The objective of discrete choice analysis is to investigate the
decision-making process of an agent, defining the factors that collec-
tively determine the agent's choice. Dynamic choice models differ
from static models in the specification of the latent variable. Indeed,
in dynamic models agents take into account the effect of their choice
and accordingly maximize their expected intertemporal utility. In
static models, the latent variable is given by the difference between
the alternative single period utility, while in the case of dynamic
models the latent variable is given by the difference between the
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value functions given by the alternative choices. The value func-
tions represent the expected value of future payoffs, and are given
by the solution to the dynamic programming problem.
The parameters to be estimated are defined as structural be-
cause they describe the preferences and expectations of an agent and
the evolution of the state variables that characterize the model. The
theory of revealed preferences provides the conditions such that it is
possible to estimate the parameters of interest through micro-data
on agent choices and state variables. Therefore, the choice models
allow to empirically test the assumptions and the implications of a
theoretical model through a simple interpretation of the parameters
that govern the Markov decision process. Moreover, these models
represent useful tools for counterfactual analysis. Indeed, they are
regularly used for the evaluation of the effects of the implementa-
tion of specific public policy.1 Hence, this close link between eco-
nomic theory and the econometric model provides new perspectives
for the comprehension of controversial empirical issues. Among the
most relevant works in the literature we mention Wolpin (1984) on
child fertility and mortality, Miller (1984) on occupational choices,
Griliches, Pakes, and Hall (1986) on patent renewal, and Rust (1987)
on machine replacement.2
However, in addition to the classic problems of any econometric
choice model (such as endogeneity, measurement errors, truncated
data, and permanent unobservable heterogeneity) the complexity of
the estimation of structural dynamic programming discrete choice
models is further complicated by computational issues. The es-
timation of these models generally requires the use of algorithms
where the solution to the dynamic programming problem is nested
within the maximization of the parameter's estimates. Therefore,
the expected value function must be calculated for each point of the
state space. Clearly, with continuous state variables the problem of
dimensionality makes quite impossible the solution to the program-
1See Wolpin (1996).
2See Aguirregabiria and Mira (2010).
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ming problem for every point of the state space. Instead, considering
a representation in a finite state space, the size of the space grows
exponentially with the number of state variables.3
Thus, the estimation requires that the dynamic programming
problem is solved for each trial vector of parameters in order to ob-
tain the solution for maximizing the estimation criterion (generally
the objective is to maximize the likelihood function). Hence, in some
case it is necessary to solve the programming problem thousands of
times. Over the years, different methodologies have been developed
in order to reduce the dimensionality problem deriving from the
computation of the expected value function for all the alternative
agent's options: the discretization of state variables, the approxi-
mation and interpolation of the expected value function4, and the
randomization of the Bellman equation5.
In the next section we introduce the reader to the basic structure
for this type of model, having in mind the final purpose of evalu-
ating the dividend policy of a company listed on the stock market.
Specifically, in the next section we evaluate the payout policy of a
manager in a framework without uncertainty and considering only
three periods.
2.1 Payout Policy Model
2.1.1 Three Periods without Uncertainty
In this section, we consider the optimal dividend policy problem
for a manager of a listed firm. Assume the company's profits are
independent on the number of companies active in the market. Thus,
we are considering a firm operating in a monopolistic or a perfectly
competitive market. The optimal dividend policy problem consists
in a rational manager who must choose whether to settle a dividend
3This issue is referred as curse of dimensionality. See Bellman (1957).
4See Kean and Woplin (1994).
5See Rust (1997).
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payment with shareholders or not.
We develop a model with only three periods, where in the first
two periods the manager has to choose whether to payout a dividend
or not, and in the third period the manager is forced to shutdown
the firm and to payout the firm's value to shareholders.
Among all the factors that influence the decision of the manager
we concentrate on the agency conflict. Essentially, we assume that
the manager is under shareholders pressure, who require the divi-
dend payments to reduce the risk associated to the possibility that
the manager wastes their wealth in unsuccessful projects. Moreover,
we assume that the payment of a dividend represents a disutility for
the manager given by a lower resources availability.
For simplicity we assume that the manager is perfectly able to
observe the second period utility, conditional on the choice made
in the first period. Let's define with UD1 the manager's utility in
the first period whether the manager chooses to payout a dividend
D, and with U01 the manager's utility in the first period in case
of no-dividend payment. UD2j indicates the utility obtained by the
manager in the second period (with j = {D, 0}) in case the manager
has chosen to payout a dividend in the first period, and U02j defines
the manager's utility whether in the first period the manager has
chosen to do not distribute a dividend. Considering the absence
of uncertainty about future impacts of manager's decision, we know
that in the second period the manager will choose the dividend policy
that provides the maximum utility, U j2 = maxj(U
jj2). Finally, U
jj
3
is the manager's utility deriving from the firm's liquidation in the
third period, which depends on the dividend policy in the previous
periods.
Therefore, assuming a time-separable utility, we can define the
manager's total expected utility (TEU) as:
TEUD = UD1 + βU
D
2 + β
2UDj3
TEU0 = U01 + βU
0
2 + β
2U0j3
where TEUD and TEU0 are the total expected utility respectively
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in case the manager has chosen to payout a dividend in the first
period or not, and β is the discount factor. Thus, the manager will
choose to pay a dividend if and only if TEUD > TEU0:
TEUD = UD1 + βU
D
2 + β
2UDj3 > TEU
0 = U01 + βU
0
2 + β
2U0j3
⇒ UD1 − U01 > β(U02 − UD2 ) + β2(U0j3 − UDj3 )
However, the researcher observes only a limited set of the factors
that affect the manager's utility. Therefore, we need to decompose
each manager's utility into an observed and unobserved part:
UD1 = u
D
1 + ε
D
1
U01 = u
0
1 + ε
0
1
for the first period,
UDj2 = u
Dj
2 + ε
Dj
2
U0j2 = u
0j
2 + ε
0j
2
for the second period, and
UDj3 = u
Dj
3 + ε
Dj
3
U0j3 = u
0j
3 + ε
0j
3
for the last period.
Denoting with fε(ε) the density function for the vector of unob-
served factors, ε = {εj1, εjj2 , εjj3 }, we can define the probability of a
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dividend payout in the first period as:
PD =Prob
(
TEUD > TEU0
)
,
=Prob
[
UD1 + βmax
j
(UDj2) + β
2UDj3 >
U01 + βmax
j
(U0j2) + β
2U0j3
]
,
=Prob
[
uD1 + ε
D
1 + βmax
j
(uDj2 + ε
Dj
2 ) + u
Dj
3 + ε
Dj
3 >
u01 + ε
0
1 + βmax
j
(u0j2 + ε
0j
2 ) + u
0j
3 + ε
0j
3
]
,
=
∫
I
[
uD1 + ε
D
1 + βmax
j
(uDj2 + ε
Dj
2 ) + u
Dj
3 + ε
Dj
3 >
u01 + ε
0
1 + βmax
j
(u0j2 + ε
0j
2 ) + u
0j
3 + ε
0j
3
]
f(ε)dε,
where I[·] is an indicator function which is equal to one when the
statement inside the parenthesis is true, and zero otherwise. Taking
N different draws from fε(ε) it is possible to compute the total ex-
pected utility for the two choices and calculate the simulated choice
probability as the average of the N values for the indicator function:
PˆD =
∑
n I
n/N . Clearly, a myopic manager (i.e., β = 0) will
choose the payout policy without taking into account the effects of
his choice on future utility.6
In the next subsection we introduce uncertainty about future
impacts of the current choices. For instance, assume the manager
is no more able to perfectly foresee the state of the economy in the
next period. Moreover, we specify how to handle the dimensionality
problem that arises from the introduction of greater realism into the
model.
6Therefore, the manager chooses to pay a dividend only if UD1 > U
0
1 . Ac-
cordingly, it would be possible to compute the simulated probability of paying
a dividend. See McFadden (1984).
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2.1.2 Three Periods with Uncertainty
In this subsection we assume that the manager is no more able to
predict the transition of the state variables. Thus, the manager no
longer observes the utility of the second period conditional on the
first-period choice, UD2j and U
0
2j ∀ j ∈ {0, D}.
Although the manager is not able to perfectly predict the re-
alization of the state variables, we assume that he has subjective
beliefs about the probability associated to a specific realization of
these variables (i.e., the manager associates a probability to each
possible realization of the state variables).
Therefore, we rewrite the second period utility as a function of
unknown factors e: UD2j(e) and U
0
2j(e). The variable e represents all
those factors that the manager does not observe in the first period,
but will become known to the manager in the second period. The
manager ascribes a probability to each possible future realization of
the factors that belong to the variable e. Therefore, we indicate with
g(e) the density function for the unobservable variable e.
However, for any value assumed by e we know that in the second
period the manager will choose the policy that gives him the max-
imum utility. For example, the second period manager's expected
utility in case he chooses to payout the dividend in the first period,
can be written as: ∫
[max
j
(UD2j(e))]g(e)d(e).
Consequently, we can write the total expected utilities for the two
dividend policies as:
TEUD = UD1 + β
∫
[max
j
(UDj2 (e))]q(e)d(e) + β
2UD3 (2.1)
TEU0 = U01 + β
∫
[max
j
(U0j2 (e))]q(e)d(e) + β
2U03 (2.2)
Thus, a rational manager will choose to payout a dividend in the
first period only if TEUD > TEU0. In the second period, the
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unobervable factors will be revealed and if the manager chose to
settle a dividend payment with shareholders in the first period, then
he will choose to pay a dividend again only if UDD2 (eˆ) > U
D0
2 (eˆ),
where eˆ is the realized value of e.
Therefore, for the researcher a further complication is added
given by the impossibility to observe the manager's distribution
function, g(e). The solution to this problem is given by the spec-
ification of a parameterization of the probability, h(e|θ), assuming
that for the true values of θ the two density functions are equivalent:
h(e|θ∗) = g(e). As a consequence, the probability that a manager
payouts a dividend is now given by:
PD =Prob(TEU
D > TEU0),
=
∫
I
[
uD1 + ε
D
1 + β
∫ {
max
j
(
uDj2 (e) + ε
Dj
2 (e)
)
+
+ β
(
uDj3 (e) + ε
Dj
3 (e)
)}
h
(
e|θ)d(e)) >
u01 + ε
0
1 + β
∫ {
max
j
(
u0j2 (e) + ε
0j
2 (e)
)
+
+ β
(
u0j3 (e) + ε
0j
3 (e)
)}
h
(
e|θ)d(e))]f(ε)dε.
We could approximate this probability through multiple draws
for ε from fε(ε) and for e from he(e|θ) simulating the inside in-
tegral within the simulation of the outside integral, and averaging
the results for the indicator function I[·]. However, the computa-
tional burden becomes extremely severe as the dimension of states
increases.7
In order to handle the dimensionality problem, in the next sub-
sections we introduce the conditional independence assumption pro-
posed by Rust (1987). Moreover, assuming the manager has an
infinite lifetime, we specify a parametrization of the manager's util-
ity function and describe the assumptions needed to estimate the
parameters of the utility and the density he(e|θ).
7See Train (2009).
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2.1.3 Infinite Horizon with Uncertainty
In the previous subsections we introduced the basic concepts of the
discrete choice dynamic programming models in a simple three pe-
riods framework. In this subsection, we further extend the model
assuming an infinite horizon choice model. Hence, the time evolves
discretely and it is indexed by t, for t = 0, ..., T , with T =∞.
Again, we assume that firms' profits are independent relative
to the number of active companies in the market (i.e., consider a
dynamic model of monopolistic competition). Therefore, we focus
on the optimal dividend policy problem of a rational manager. Every
period the manager decides whether to keep inside the company the
free-cash flow without making a dividend payment (d = 0), or to
payout a dividend (d = 1).
The manager chooses the dividend payout policy to maximize
the expected and discounted stream of current and future values
of his utility function. Once again, we assume that the manager's
preferences are represented by a time-separable function. There-
fore, the manager's preferences are given by an infinite discounted
sum of a state-dependent utility function
∑T
t=0 β
tU(dt, xt, et), where
β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor, U(dt, xt, et) is the utility function
at time t, xt represents the state variables that the manager ob-
serves, and et represent the unknown factors that becomes known
to the manager after his choice. We specify the managers' beliefs
on the evolution of future values of the state variables by a Markov
transition distribution function F (xt+1, et+1|xt, et, dt).
Blackwell's Theorem establishes that under very general condi-
tions the solution to a Markovian decision problem exists and is
unique.8 The solution to the dynamic model takes the form of a
decision rule that relates the state variables to the manager's choice
{dt = ft(xt, t)
T
t=0} that specifies the agent's optimal action dt in
state (xt, t). The function δ = {d = f(x, e)} defines the opti-
mal agent's decision rule and is considered deterministic. Namely,
conditional on the realizations of x and e, and observing the man-
8Blackwell (1965).
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ager's beliefs, then the manager's choice will be completely deter-
minable.9 By Bellman's principal of optimality, we can separate
the manager's current decision-making from the future decision pro-
cess. Using the recursive expression, we define the value function of
the dynamic programming problem by:
V (x, e) = max
d∈{0,1}
{
U(d, x, e)+β
∫
V (x′, e′)dF (x′, e′|x, e, d)
}
, (2.3)
accordingly, the optimal decision rule is given by:
δ(d, x, e) = arg max
d∈{0,1}
{
U(d, x, e) + β
∫
V (x′, e′)dF (x′, e′|x, e, d)
}
.
(2.4)
From a causal perspective, our objective is to analyze the man-
ager's decision process by defining the factors that jointly cause the
manager's choice. Unfortunately we are able to observe only a lim-
ited set of variables that influence the manager choice, as a conse-
quence the choice of the manager cannot be exactly predicted. As
we have seen in the previous paragraph, the computational burden is
very high, especially in a framework with uncertainty and infinitely
lived firms/managers.
The dynamic conditional logit model first advocated by Rust
(1987) provides a large gain in computational feasibility, allowing
the estimation of the structural parameters in the manager's pref-
erences, transition probabilities, and the discount factor. The in-
tuition behind the Rust model is to consider the factors that the
agent/manager observes only after he took his choice, as the same
factors that the researcher does not observe either before or after
the agent's decision.
In the next section we state the assumptions entailed by the
dynamic programming conditional logit model, and we specify the
estimation strategy for the primitive structural parameters.
9Notice that we omitted the time subscripts. In an infinite-horizon frame-
work we assume that the dynamic problem is stationary. Therefore, the optimal
policy rule and the corresponding value function are time invariant.
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2.2 MLE Estimation for DDC Model
In this section we define the assumptions so that it is possible to
obtain a closed form of the conditional choice probability.
Indicate with the variable x the vector of observable factors
within the data set (i.e. firm's and market's demographics, firm's
free-cash flow, and the dividend policy of the previous period), and
with the variable ε the vector of unobservable factors for the re-
searcher. As in the section 2.1.3, define with θ the vector of struc-
tural parameters for the utility function and the transition of x, and
with li(θ) the log-likelihood function for manager i. Accordingly, the
manager's decision problem is then to choose a sequence of payout
decision rules δ = {d = f(x, ε, θ)} to maximize the expected and
discounted stream of current and future values of his lifetime utility.
Assumption 1. The unobservable state variables are indepen-
dently and identically distributed over agents, alternatives, and time.
The CDF Fε(ε) has finite first moments and is continuous and twice
differentiable in ε. Specifically, we assume that the shocks εt have
an extreme value type I distributions centered around 0.
Assumption 2. Assume that the unobservable state variables
ε(d) enter additively in the manager's utility function. They can be
thought as transitory shocks to the manager's utility.
Given these assumptions we can rewrite the Bellman's equation
from the researcher perspective as:
Vθ(x, ) = max
d∈{0,1}
{
u(d, x, θ) + ε(d) + βEVθ(d, x, ε)
}
, (2.5)
with the function EVθ(x, ε, d) defined by:
EVθ(d, x, ) ≡
∫
y
∫
η
Vθ(y, η)p(dy, dη|x, ε, d, θ), (2.6)
where the expectation is taken with respect to the transi-
tion density for the controlled stochastic process {x, ε} defined
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by the decision rule δ(x, ε) ∈ D(x) and the transition density
p(x′, ε′|x, ε, d),D(x) represents the finite choice set of payout policy
given x.10 Blackwell's theorem states that the sequence of decision
rules {δt, δt+1, δt+2, ...} is stationary and Markovian, so the agent's
optimal decision rule depends only on the current values of the state
variables, and is determined by finding the alternative payout policy
that provides the maximum in Bellman's equation. Specifically, the
optimal time-invariant policy rule is given by:
δ(x, ε, θ) = arg max
d∈{0,1}
{
u(d, x, θ) + ε(d) + βEVθ(d, x, ε)
}
. (2.7)
Our objective is to find the vector θ∗ that maximizes the sum of
the log-likelihood for the N managers selected from a random sam-
ple. In particular, the sample likelihood function is derived from the
conditional choice probabilities P (d|x), which are obtained from the
agents' optimal decision rule by integrating out over the unobserved
state variable ε given fε(ε|x). However, since ε is a continuously
distributed on RS , where S = #D(x), the approximation of (2.7) is
computationally unattainable. Moreover, from the last equation no-
tice that ε enters nonlinearly in the unknown conditional value func-
tion EVθ, therefore the computation of P (d|x) requires to integrate
the value function with respect to the density p(xt+1, εt+1|xt, εt, dt)
to solve the Bellman's equation (2.5). Rust proposed the following
conditional independence assumption on the Markovian transition
probabilities to alleviate the computational burden:
Assumption 3. The future realizations of the observable state
variables are independent of the present unobservable factors condi-
tional on the current choice and realization of the observable state
variables. That is: p(xit+1|xit, εit, dit) = p(xit+1|xit, dit). This as-
sumption implies that the joint probability of the state variables can
be written as:
p(xit+1, εit+1|xit, εit, dit) = p(xit+1|xit, dit)q(εit+1|εit). (2.8)
10In the bivariate case: D(x) ∈ {0, 1}
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The additive separability and the conditional independence as-
sumptions are sufficient to guarantee that the conditional choice
probability is positive for all possible parameters: P (d|x, θ) > 0.
As Rust (1987) noted, this result is equivalent to say that the set
{|d = δ(x, )} has positive probability under q(d|x).11 Under the
assumptions 2 and 3 it's possible to write again the Bellman equa-
tion:
V (x, ε) = max
d∈(0,1)
[υ(x, d) + ε(t)] (2.9)
with
υ(x, d) ≡ u(x, d) + β
∫
x
∫
ε
V (x′, ε′)q(dε|x′)p(dx|x, d). (2.10)
Therefore, it is possible to reach the same structure of static
discrete choice problems, the only difference is the value function
υ that substitutes the single period utility function u as argument
of the conditional choice probability. The optimal decision rule δ is
given by
δ(x, ) = arg max
d∈(0,1)
[υ(x, d) + (d)], (2.11)
where υ is the solution to the dynamic programming problem.
The conditional choice probability P (d|x) can be defined in terms of
the social surplus function:12
G([υ(x, d) + (d)]|x) =
∫
max
d∈(0,1)
[υ(x, d) + (d)]q(dε|x), (2.12)
11Rust (1987) defines saturated a specification for unobservables if does not
exists a combination of choice and state variables that contradicts the DDP
model for any value of .
12See McFadden (1981) to go deeply in the definition and properties of the
social surplus function.
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taking the partial derivative of G with respect to υ(x, d)
∂G([υ(x, d) + (d)]|x)
∂υ(x, d)
=
∫ (
∂maxd∈{0,1}[υ(x, d) + (d)]
∂υ(x, d)
)
q(dε|x)
=
∫
I{d = arg max
d′∈(0,1)
[υ(x, d′) + (d′)]}q(dε|x)
= P (d|x).
(2.13)
Hence, the conditional choice probability P (d|x) will be equal to
the partial derivative of G with respect to the unique fixed point υ.
The assumption 3 of conditional independence allows us to deter-
mine the fixed point υ, avoiding having to integrate over the entire
state space (x, ε). Hence, the controlled process {xt, t} is Markovian
with transition probability:
Pr{dxt+1, dt+1|xt, dt} = P (dt+1|xt+1)p(dxt+1|xt, dt). (2.14)
Thus, substituting the 2.9 into 2.10 we can rewrite the equation
for υ as:
υ(x, d) = u(x, d) + β
∫
x
∫
ε
max
d∈(0,1)
[υ(x, d) + (d)]q(dε|x′)p(dx|x, d)
= u(x, d) + β
∫
x
G([υ(x′, d′), d′ ∈ {0, 1}|x′]p(dx|x, d).
(2.15)
With the assumption 1 we assumed that the unobservable state
variable {t(dt)} follows an i.i.d. bivariate extreme value process.
Therefore, we can write the conditional choice probability as:
P (d|x) = exp{υ(x, 0)}∑
d∈{0,1} exp{υ(x, d)}
, (2.16)
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where υ is the unique fixed point to the contraction mapping Ψ:
Ψ(υ)(x, d) = u(x, d) + β
∫
x
log
[ ∑
d∈{0,1}
exp{υ(x, d)}
]
p(dx|x, d).
(2.17)
Given these assumptions we obtain a closed-form expression for
G(·) and P (·), and we can define the estimation criterion for the
structural parameters of the controlled process {xt, dt}. We assumed
that the observable state variables (x) have a discrete and finite sup-
port, and from the initial values x0 they follow a first-order Markov
chain with transition probability matrix Π.13 Lastly, we define the
likelihood function for N independent managers:
N∏
i=1
`(x, d|x0, d0, θ) =
N∏
i=1
T∏
t=1
P (dit|xit, θ)p(xit|xit−1, dit−1). (2.18)
We employ the nested fixed point (NFXP) algorithm to esti-
mate the parameters of the model. The NFXP algorithm proposed
by Rust (1987) involves a 3-stage procedure that yields consistent,
asymptotically normal and efficient estimates. In the first stage we
nonparametrically estimate the partial likelihood for the transition
of the observable state variable. In the second stage we estimate the
vector Θ of parameters of the utility function using the first stage
estimate as if we knew the true process of x:
Θˆp = arg max
N∏
i=1
T∏
t=1
P (dit|xit, θ). (2.19)
As showed, we need to solve the discrete decision problem at
each likelihood function evaluation. The third stage consists in
one more Newton-Raphson iteration on the full likelihood function
13With element pj,k representing the conditional probability of moving from
state j to state k, pi,j = Pr[xt+1 = j|xt = i].
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`(x, d|x0, d0, θ) using as starting values the estimates of the first two
stages.14
The next subsection provides a parametric specification of the
manager's preferences such that we are in the position to estimate
the structural parameters governing the dividend payout policy.
2.2.1 Specification of Manager's Preferences
In this section we specify the parametric structure of the utility func-
tion for a representative rational manager, so as to identify the set of
primitives (u, p, β) of the MDP. The construction of the theoretical
model reflects constraints relative to computational feasibility and
availability of good data.
In the literature review we have seen that signaling motives and
agency costs are identified as the main causes of dividend policy
changes. Indeed, Rozeff (1982), Jensen (1986), and La Porta et al.
(2000b), consider that dividend payments represent a tool to reduce
agency costs. Asquith and Mullins Jr (1983) find that dividend ini-
tiations have a positive announcement effect on stock prices. The
researchers conclude that investors interpret dividend initiations as
good news in terms of firm growth opportunities, thus they put a
premium on the stocks of dividend payers versus non-payers. Con-
sistently, Baker and Wurgler (2004) argue that managers cater to
investors by initiating dividends, and they show results in favor of
this theory. Moreover, according to Michaely, Thaler, and Wom-
ack (1995b), firms that omit dividend payments are characterized
by negative excess returns.
Consequently, we examine whether the entry benefit and exit
cost are able to explain the widely established smoothed behavior of
dividends. In particular, we test whether managers behave myopi-
cally or take into account the effects on future periods of the policy
chosen in the current period.
Although our partial equilibrium model does not endogenously
14Rust (1994).
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incorporate shareholders and investors reactions to the manager's
dividend policy we assume that managers' beliefs are coherent with
the standpoint that investors always reward companies that dis-
tribute dividends, and vice versa they punish companies that stop
distributing dividends. This assumption is consistent with the em-
pirical evidences on manager-shareholders agency conflict, dividend
initiations and omissions.
Therefore, our model incorporates these factors that simulta-
neously affect the managers' decisions. Specifically, we allow for
three features in the manager's utility function: the entry benefit for
initializing a dividend payment; the exit cost of omitting dividend
payouts; the agency conflict between manager and shareholders. Ar-
guably, in this way it is possible to explain the managers' reluctance
to modify the dividend policy.
Basically, we present a model where every period a rational man-
ager wants to minimize the disutility of agency cost deciding whether
payout a dividend or not. Thus, the expected one-period utility
function for manager i is given by:
u(xt, ε, dt, θ) =
{
−θ01yt − θ02at − θ03kt + εt(0) if dt = 0
− θ11yt + θ12(1− kt) + εt(1) if dt = 1
(2.20)
where yt is the free-cash flow at the beginning of time t, and at
represents the number of periods since last dividend payment. The
inclusion of the i.i.d. error term (εt(dt)) in the manager's utility
function controls for exogenous factors that affect the payout plans.
The term at is included in the agency cost function consistently
with life-cycle theory of dividends, where managers of more mature
and profitable companies face higher agency costs of cash reten-
tion.15 The state variable kt ≡ dt−1 is an indicator of the manager's
choice in the previous period, which is equal to 1 if the manager
chose to payout the dividend. What follows is a discussion on the
15See Denis and Osobov (2008) for international evidence supportive of
agency-cost based on dividend lifecycle theory.
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interpretation of the parameters we are going to estimate.
The parameter θ01 is the agency conflict disutiltiy of the manager
when he decides not to pay dividends. We assume that shareholders
observe yt at beginning of the period, thus the shareholders-manager
conflict is proportional to the free-cash flow level.16 The parameter
θ11 captures the disutility of paying dividends, representing the man-
ager's agency cost to commit financial resources. We assume that
the disutility of paying dividends is decreasing with respect to the
free-cash flow level at beginning of the period, consistently with Brav
et al. (2005) who find that managers consider dividends less flexible
than repurchases and provide dividend payments only when they can
be sustained. The parameter θ03 in (2.22) is the lump-sum cost of a
dividend omission, (i.e., dt = 0 and kt = 1). Specifically, this param-
eter measures the sunk cost effect extensively documented by social
scientists (see Thaler, 1980 and Staw, 1981): once having committed
to a course of action, the decision maker sticks to the same policy
despite he discovers new information that indicates that continuing
the earlier commitment would likely result in worse consequences
than switching.17 Finally, the parameter θ12 is the entry gain of
initiating an enduring dividend program, (i.e., dt = 1 and kt = 0).
In order to estimate the vector θ∗ that maximizes the sum of the
log-likelihood for the N managers, we firstly estimate the transition
probabilities for the observable state variables, then we employ the
method of successive approximations to compute the fixed point
V ∗. Once computed the fixed point, we may establish the optimal
decision rule δ(x, ε).
In the next section we describe the selection method for the com-
panies in our sample and we provide descriptive statistics for the
variables of interest.
16We specify this structure of the agency costs consistently with the findings
of DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Stulz (2006). In particular, they find a highly
significant relation between the decision to pay dividends and the earnings to
total assets ratio.
17Kanodia, Bushman, and Dickhaut (1989).
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2.3 Estimation Analysis
In this section we describe the sample and define the set of observable
state variables. Furthermore, we provide estimates for the transition
probabilities and the specification of the manager's utility function
that characterize the dividend policy. Finally, through the DCDP
model, we estimate the primitives for the manager's decision rule,
δ(x, ε).
2.3.1 The Sample Data
The data are taken from the Orbis database compiled by the Bureau
van Dijk (BvD) which provides detailed accounting information of
more than 10 million companies worldwide.
In this section we focus on listed firms located in the Euro-area
for the period 2009-2017. Given the assumption of homogeneity
among firms, we focus on French and German companies, as the
respective countries are the most similar economies among those
within the monetary union.18 We excluded from the sample the
companies that report one or more missing values in the dividend
variable in the time-span considered. Moreover, we removed from
the sample all the financial firms and those firms that experienced ex-
ceptional liquidity events (e.g. capital increase, management buy-in
or buy-out, mergers and acquisitions, initial public offering, private
equity and venture capital financing). Lastly, we dropped those firms
that exhibit extraordinary variation in the main observable state
variable, return to asset (ROA) index.19 The final sample consists
of 473 companies, Table 2.1 and 2.2 shows descriptive statistics.
18Despite the Italian economy shares several aspects with the French and
German economies, we excluded Italian companies as in 2011 the Italian gov-
ernment implemented a reform that likely changed the managers' preferences.
We investigate the Italian case in the next chapter.
19We removed those firms that for at least one year are below the 1st per-
centile and above the 99th percentile of the ROA year-differences distribution.
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics
Mean Median Std.Dev.
EBITDA 9.33% 10.00% 0.13
Equity 43.52% 4.60% 0.38
Fix. 47.97% 46.26% 0.21
Mrkt Cap 105.06% 64.00% 3.26
Dividends 1.76% 0.89% 0.04
Note: Summary statistics refer to the period
2009-2017 for 473 firms located in France and
Germany. All the variables are scaled by firm's
total assets.
The Orbis dataset provides an indicator of ownership indepen-
dence based on the percentage of shares outstanding owned by a
single shareholder. Table 2.2 presents the companies' distribution
by ownership indicator. In particular, a firm is indicated with A if
are not recorded shareholders that directly or indirectly own more
than 25% of shares outstanding. The firms indicated with B do
not present a shareholder with more than 50% direct or indirect
ownership, but one or more shareholders are recorded with more
than 25% direct or total ownership. Finally, the firms in the group
D have one shareholder with a direct ownership of over 50%. The
Table 2.2 confirms the predictions of the agency theory. In fact,
companies with greater shareholders dispersion distribute dividends
more frequently.
In the next subsection, we estimate the conditional probability
distribution for the state xt+1 at time t+ 1 conditional on the cur-
rent state (xt) and plan (dt). Then we present the estimates of
the parameter vector θ. In the basic model we consider the binary
choice to distribute the dividend or not. In order to differentiate
the dividend omission cost, in subsection 2.3.4 we extend the model
allowing for more payout policies.
In both models we consider two sub-samples based on the indica-
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tor of share ownership dispersion. Consistently with Rozeff (1982),
we expect that the agency cost estimates monotonically increase
with respect to the dispersion indicator.
Table 2.2: Choice Distribution: Owner-
ship Dispersion
Indep. Indicator d = 0 d = 1 Total
A−B 834 1,502 2,336
C −D 531 917 1,448
Total 1,365 2,419 3,784
Note: The observation are divided by the
ownership concentration identifier and the
yearly payout policy.
2.3.2 Estimation of the Manager's Beliefs
In this section we estimate the transition probabilities of the state
variables yt and at. The two variables are assumed to be discrete,
therefore we estimate the transition matrix (Π) for the joint distri-
bution of the observable state variables.
The decision period is assumed to be a year. The discrete decision
dt is the manager's plan regarding dividend payment at the end
of the year, that is revised at one-year time intervals. The state
variables xt refer to the manager's state at beginning of the year.
Specifically, the variable y is computed as the earnings to total assets
ratio, while the variable a is the number of periods since the last
dividend payment. We discretized the variable y into 20 intervals of
equal length. We assume that the transitions of y from t to t + 1
follows a first-order Markov process. at follows a clear deterministic
distribution and it is discretized into 30 intervals, with amax = 30
as absorbing state.20
20at = T means that the company does not pay dividends for T consecutive
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The Rust's conditional independence assumption implies that the
transition probability of the vector of observable state variables xt
is:
p(xt+1|xt) ≡ p(yt+1, at+1|yt, at, dt). (2.21)
We nonparametrically estimate this joint transition probability
using the corresponding sample relative frequencies for the grid val-
ues of xt and dt. In particular, we compute a frequency estimate of
the Markov transition matrix from the transition data:
pˆij = Prob(xt = j|xt−1 = i)
=
nij∑m
s=1 nis
,
where nis is the number of times that the process moved from state
i to s, and the denominator is the number of transitions out of state
i.
The conditional independence assumption ensures that the ex-
pected value function is also independent with respect to unobserv-
able state variables, i.e. EVθ(x, ε, d) = EVθ(x, d).
Given the discretization of yt and at, the fixed point EV (·) is
computed as an element of the Banach space B = R20x30.
With the estimate of p(xt+1|xt) and EV (·), we are in the position
to estimate the vector of parameters θ by the two stage algorithm.
2.3.3 Estimation of the Manger's Utility Func-
tion
We formalize the revealed preference problem as a problem of sta-
tistical inference. The null hypothesis is that the data {d, x} are
realizations of a controlled stochastic process generated from the so-
lution to a stochastic dynamic programming problem with utility
function u that depends on a vector of unknown parameters θ. The
periods. If the manager chooses to payout the dividend at time t (dt = 1), next
year state is equal to one (at+1 = 1).
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underlying preferences u are uncovered by finding the parameter
vector θˆ that maximizes the likelihood function for the sample of
data. The associated log-likelihood function is:
L(θ) =
480∑
i=1
8∑
t=1
[
I(dit = 0)log
(
exp0(·)
exp0(·) + exp1(·)
)
+
+ I(dit = 1)log
(
exp1(·)
exp0(·) + exp1(·)
)]
with exp0(·) = exp
(−θ01y − θ02at − θ03kt + βEV (x′|x, d = 0)) ,
and exp1(·) = exp
(
−θ11
yt
+ θ12(1− kt) + βEV (x′|x, d = 1)
)
.
We do not directly estimate β because is highly collinear with
the preference parameters.21 However, as usual in dynamic models
estimation, we establish subjective discount factor β via grid search:
we start maximizing the likelihood function at β = 0 and use these
estimates as initial values for estimations with higher values of β.
Table 2.3 presents estimates of the utility function with discount
factor β = 0.95, and separately for the group of firms with owner-
ship dispersion indicator (A-B) and (C-D). The maximum likelihood
estimates are statistically significant. The predictions provided by
the agency theory are confirmed. The pool of firms with higher
ownership dispersion (A-B) show higher cost of cash retention with
respect to firms with low ownership dispersion (C-D). Table 2.3 pro-
vides the Heterogeneity test that assess the equality of the agency
cost parameters between the two groups of firms. The data reject
the hypothesis that the structural coefficients (θ01) are the same for
firms groups (A-B) and (C-D).
The estimates obtained fixing the discount rate at zero (β = 0)
provides the myopic test, as suggested by Rust (1987). Basically,
with β = 0 the manager chooses to payout the dividend evaluating
the single period utility only. Comparing the estimations with β = 0
and β = 0.95, we can asses whether the manager takes in considera-
tion the effect on the future of the current choice. Table 2.3 provides
21See Rust (1994).
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the likelihood ratio test with the null hypothesis of equality between
the two models. We rejected the null and conclude that the dynamic
model explains the data better than the static model.
The χ2 goodness-of-fit statistic provides an overall test of the
null hyphothesis that the econometric model is correctly specified,
(Rust, 1994). The test assesses whether managers are rational, in
the sense of acting as if they were solving the specified dynamic
programming problem. If the data appear to be consistent with
the dynamic programming model, the estimated model can be used
to forecast the effect of policy changes such as the introduction of
a reform. In our model, the χ2 has 35 degrees of freedom (the
number of relevant cells (20 × 2) minus the numbers of parameters
4 minus one), and it is equal to 3.6. Thus, it may be concluded that
statistically our model describes the data well.
The next subsection provides the estimation results allowing the
manager to choose among five dividend policies.
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Table 2.3: Structural Estimates for the Agency Cost
Function
Parameter Estimate Std Error
Firm's ownership indicator: A-B
θ01 (agency cost) -0.0799 0.0033
θ02 (time) -1.5419 0.7820
θ03 (d = 1 → d = 0) -2.7193 0.1328
θ11 (opport. cost) -0.8870 0.0811
Firm's ownership indicator: C-D
θ01 (agency cost) -0.0610 0.0038
θ02 (time) -1.0224 0.5312
θ03 (d = 1 → d = 0) -2.7620 0.1550
θ11 (opport. cost) -0.6232 0.0960
β = 0.95
Heterogeneity Test: (A-B) vs (C-D)
LR Statistic (df = 4) 20.54
Myopia Test: β=0 vs β=95
LR Statistic (df = 1) 23.56 28.64
χ2 (df = 35) = 3.621
Note: the covariance matrix is computed by inverting the infor-
mation matrix for the partial likelihood function 2.19.
2.3.4 Dividend Policy with Multiple Options
In this subsection we increase the manager's dividend policy options.
Expanding the set of manager's options gives us the possibility to
distinguish between dividend payout reductions and omissions, and
between dividend payout increases and initiations. Therefore, the
choice variable is no more binary but we consider d as the dividend
free-cash flow ratio, and the manager has the possibility to choose
among five different policies.
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Grullon and Michaely (2004) note that the reaction of the market
is proportional to the entity of the variation in dividends or share
repurchases. Indeed, more the dividend differs from the expected
one, stronger the impact on the share price. The model with multiple
options reflects the Grullon and Michaely evidence in the manager's
utility function.
Basically, we split the dividend payout ratio (computed as the
dividend to equity ratio) in five intervals of the same length. The
single period utility function for the manager becomes:
u(xt, ε, dt; θ) =

−θ01y − θ02at +
4∑
j=1
θ03jI{dt = 0, kt = j}+ εt(0)
if dt = 0
4∑
i=1
5∑
j=1
− θ1i
yt
− θ1ij + εt(i)
if dt = i
(2.22)
where I{·} is an indicator function that defines the transitions
of the dividend policy from t − 1 to t. In case the dividend policy
does not change from a period to the subsequent we assume that the
lump-sum cost or benefit are equal to zero.
For the estimation procedure of the DPDC model nothing
changes except the computational cost which increases considerably.
The Table 2.4 presents the estimates. We see that our predictions
are confirmed also by providing more flexibility to the manager's
choice.
In the next chapter we use the structural estimates obtained
in the two versions of the dividend payout model to simulate the
probability of paying a dividend to the introduction of the so-called
Allowances for Corporate Equity, (ACE). The ACE (also known
as Notional Interest) is a tax system able to equalize the tax treat-
ment between debt and equity at the corporate level. We briefly
explain the ACE tax system. Then, we evaluate the impact of the
ACE relief on Italian companies. Indeed, in 2011 Italian government
implemented the ACE regime. Finally, through the DPDC model,
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we simulate the variation of the probability to payout a dividend for
different percentages of the ACE relief.
Table 2.4: Structural Estimates for the Agency Cost Func-
tion
Firm's ownership indicator: A-B C-D
θ01 (agency cost) -0.0282 -0.0252
(0.0034) (0.0044)
θ11 (opp. cost) -1.6117 -0.8140
(0.1722) (0.1881)
θ12 (opp. cost) -1.4276 -1.4841
(0.1672) (0.1863)
θ13 (opp. cost) -2.6300 -4.3164
(0.2535) (0.4547)
θ14 (opp. cost) -1.8348 -1.6413
(0.2234) (0.2071)
θ02 (time) -1.7135 -1.5420
(1.022) (0.9561)
θ031 (d = 0, k = 1) -3.5852 -3.8690
(0.5517) (0.9290)
θ032 (d = 0, k = 2) -5.5929 -5.9137
(0.4316) (0.5820)
θ033 (d = 0, k = 3) -7.1369 -7.7413
(0.4091) (0.6591)
θ034 (d = 0, k = 4) -8.2632 -9.6813
(0.4351) (0.6075)
θ110 (d = 1, k = 0) 0.0000 0.0000
(0.5169) (0.8792)
θ112 (d = 1, k = 2) -2.7612 -3.4968
(0.5921) (0.9082)
θ113 (d = 1, k = 3) -5.5096 -6.9193
(0.6562) (1.1509)
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θ114 (d = 1, k = 4) -6.7009 -7.8273
(0.5968) (0.7832)
θ120 (d = 2, k = 0) 0.8058 1.0239
(0.3608) (0.5439)
θ121 (d = 2, k = 1) 0.0000 0.0000
(0.5928) (0.9096)
θ123 (d = 2, k = 3) -2.6820 -2.9922
(0.3582) (0.5886)
θ124 (d = 2, k = 4) -5.4121 -5.8109
(0.4422) (0.5858)
θ130 (d = 3, k = 0) 1.7898 2.4207
(0.2587) (0.4195)
θ131 (d = 3, k = 1) 0.0000 0.0000
(0.7953) (1.3137)
θ132 (d = 3, k = 2) 0.0000 0.0000
(0.4229) (0.5800)
θ134 (d = 3, k = 4) -2.3675 -2.8289
(0.1932) (0.3572)
β = 0.95
Heterogeneity Test:(A-B) vs (C-D)
LR Statistic (df = 35) 15.33
Myopia Test: β=0 vs β=95
LR Statistic (df = 1) 34.65 37.21
χ2 = 4.978
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
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Case Study: The ACE
Tax Regime
In almost all developed economies we find a tax system that allows
the deductibility of interest payments, while equity returns are fully
taxed. This tax discrimination between debt and equity generates
the so-called debt bias, that is an excessive use of leverage by com-
panies. In countries with weak equity markets and strong exposition
to debt this distortion can make the entire economy extremely vul-
nerable to business cycle downturns, in fact the failure of multiple
companies could cause significant damage to the financial system.1
In 2011 the Italian government, within the fiscal policy package
aimed at limiting the financial and sovereign debt crisis of the last
decade, enforced a tool to limit the equity-debt distortion: the Al-
lowances to Corporate Equity (ACE) tax regime. The ACE system
provides for a tax relief calculated by applying a notional interest
rate to a net equity base.2 The ACE base is determined as the
1See De Mooij (2012) for an extensive discussion on the effects of debt bias
on the financial sector.
2The ACE notional rate was set at 3% for the first three years of the program,
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positive variation of equity occurred since the end of the year 2010.
The relevant variation in equity for the computation of the ACE
base is determined as the sum of contributions in cash from share-
holders and the retained earnings that increment reserve provisions
(except non-distributable reserves) minus voluntary distributions to
shareholders and reductions due to anti-avoidance rules.3
Intuitively, the implementation of the ACE regime should have
straightforward consequences on the corporate dividend policy. In-
deed, we expect that those Italian companies that are used to dis-
tribute dividends to interrupt dividend payments in order to take
advantage of the subsidy. Furthermore, those companies that have
not paid any dividend in the previous year, we expect they do not
initialize a dividend payment after the 2011 ACE reform.
In this chapter, we first estimate the impact of the ACE re-
lief on Italian companies' dividend decisions with a reduced form
equation. Then, in a structural estimation framework, we simulate
the manager response for different values of the ACE relief. The
structural estimation provides a useful environment to achieve this
purpose since we can explicitly solve the optimization problem and
determine a new optimal decision rule.
3.1 Empirical Predictions of the Dividend
Literature
In this section of the chapter we briefly reviews the predictions on the
determinants of corporate dividend policy provided by the empirical
dividend literature. Based on these findings, we develop a model in
reduced form that allows us to correctly estimate the impact of the
and to 4%, 4.5%, 4.75%, 1.6% and 1.5% for the years 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017,
and 2018 respectively.
3The anti-avoidance rule aims at eliminating the cascade effects of tax
reliefs. Therefore, if shareholders injects new equity in a company and this
capital is again transferred to a subsidiary, then only the subsidiary benefits of
the tax relief.
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ACE subsidy taking into account all the specific determinants that
affect dividend decisions.
Based on the literature review made in the first chapter, we pro-
vide a list of the relevant predictions for the specification of the
regression model that we employ in the next section:
1. Firms that have higher uncertainty about future earnings tend
to payout none or lower dividends, indeed Jensen, Solberg, and
Zorn (1992) report a negative relation between business risk
and dividend policy supporting this hypothesis.
2. Myers (1984) and Myers and Majluf (1984) hypothesize
that companies finance their investments through a hierarchy
among funding resources. According to this theory internal
funds are the main source of financing, thus dividend payments
are negatively related to firm's investment opportunities.
3. According to Bhattacharya (1979), Miller and Rock (1985),
and John and Williams (1985) initiations and increases of div-
idend payments signal an improvement in the company's prof-
itability. Therefore, there is a positive relationship between
profitability and the dividend payments.
4. According to Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Jensen (1986),
debt and dividend policies are the most relevant mechanisms
to regulate agency costs of free-cash flow. Hence, the dividend
literature predicts a negative relationship between debt policy
and the dividend payments.
The following sections describe the methodology used in this
chapter of the thesis. First of all, the sample data is explained,
subsequently the variables, and the models are presented, lastly the
results from the estimations are shown and commented.
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3.2 The ACE Implementation in Italy
The purpose of this section is to investigate the sample data em-
ployed in order to test the research hypothesis after the implementa-
tion of the ACE regime in Italy. In order to achieve this purpose the
next section proposes a Differences-in-Differences (DiD) approach
to obtain casual estimates of the ACE policy change that affected
Italian firms since the end of 2011. We compare Italian firms af-
fected by the reform before and after and firms from the Euro-area
unaffected by this reform. We need to assume that the firms in the
two groups are subject to the same time trends such that the DiD
approach estimates the effect of the ACE reform. For this reason we
restrict the analysis to companies located in countries very similar to
Italy, specifically we chose France and Germany. Among the coun-
tries belonging to the eurozone, we selected France and Germany on
the basis of the companies distribution by economic sectors, nominal
gross domestic product, and dividend on equity ratio of these coun-
tries. Figure 3.1 shows the average dividends time series comparing
Italy with France and Germany.
Figure 3.1: Average Dividends Time Series
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The two figures confirm the assumption of common trend before
the implementation of the ACE reform. The source of the data is
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the Orbis database that contains detailed accounting and financial
information. Following the related literature we excluded those firms
operating in the financial and utilities sector. We consider the 2009-
2017 period and we exclude from the sample those firms with missing
values in the dividend variable in any of the selected years, and those
firms that during this period experienced relevant liquidity events
such as: acquisition, initial public offering, institutional buy-out,
management buy-in and buy-out, private equity and venture capital
financing. The sample selection criteria result in a panel data set of
555 non-financial companies: 209 French, 306 German and 40 Italian
companies.
Table 3.1: Summary Statistics: Dividends
Country Mean Median Std.Dev. Obs.
France 130.3 2.7 509.2 1,881
Germany 73.6 1.0 344.5 2,754
Italy 127.5 2.9 584.4 360
Total 98.9 1.6 434.0 4,995
Note: Summary statistics refer to 559 firms over the
period 2009-2017. Values are expressed in millions
of euros.
Table 3.1 and 3.2 present some descriptive statistics for the div-
idend variable for each country. The tables show that these com-
panies pay very high dividends both in absolute terms and with
respect to the amount of liquid assets. However, from the Table 3.2
it is possible to note that on average Italian companies started to
reduce the dividend payments since the year 2012. As can be seen
from Table 3.3, the reduction in dividends is not a consequence of
a reduction in earnings, in fact the average earnings to liquid assets
ratio remains stable over the period. These data confirm that due
to changes in the Italian corporate tax system Italian firms have
progressively reduced the dividend payouts. However, it seems that
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Table 3.2: Dividend Payout
France Germany Italy
Div. D.P.R. Div. D.P.R. Div. D.P.R.
2009 118.3 3.69% 39.5 2.49% 174.4 5.07%
2010 116.8 4.21% 58.9 4.02% 174.9 5.07%
2011 127.4 3.65% 68.4 4.05% 186.3 5.42%
2012 130.3 4.40% 70.8 4.21% 179.3 5.23%
2013 130.3 3.44% 69.2 3.92% 157.7 4.60%
2014 131.7 3.09 % 75.0 4.19% 145.5 4.00%
2015 139.9 2.88% 85.8 4.28% 129.3 3.93%
2016 141.7 2.93% 90.2 4.05% 0.00 0.00%
2017 151.0 3.21% 100.4 3.92% 0.00 0.00%
Note: The table reports the time series of the average dividend
payout in millions of euros and the average dividend payout ratio.
The dividend payout ratio is given by the dividend payment divided
by the total equity at the beginning of the year.
Italian companies have needed to take time to adjust their dividend
policies. We believe that the difficulty of Italian firms to adjust
their dividend policy is mainly due to the high costs resulting from
a sudden reduction of the dividend payout ratio.
3.3 Econometric Models and Results
In this section, we estimate the impact of the ACE reform on the
dividend payout policy of Italian firms. Intuitively, since dividend
payouts reduce the net equity base for the calculation of the subsidy,
Italian companies that regularly payout a dividend before the imple-
mentation of the ACE reform should significantly reduce their div-
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Table 3.3: Earnings
France Germany Italy
Earnings to Earnings to Earnings to
Liquid Assets Liquid Assets Liquid Assets
Ratio Ratio Ratio
2009 1.22 1.52 1.26
2010 1.42 1.62 1.28
2011 -2.73 1.36 1.28
2012 1.00 1.37 1.27
2013 0.91 1.34 1.25
2014 1.13 1.25 1.26
2015 0.18 0.77 1.25
2016 0.98 1.34 1.27
2017 1.29 1.31 1.30
Note: The table reports the time series of the average
of EBITDA at the end of the year plus liquid assets at
the beginning of the year divided by liquid assets at the
beginning of the year.
idend payments.4 Moreover, firms that omitted dividend payments
before the reform should not initiate a dividend payment after the
implementation of the ACE reform.
We employ the identification strategy for the direct effect of the
ACE subsidy on the dividend payout policy of Italian companies.
Namely, we assume a linear model for dividends:
yit = α+ β2Italyi + β3Postt ⊗ Italyi + xitβ + τt + εit, (3.1)
where i and t index companies and years respectively. The em-
pirical specification in equation (3.1) is implemented to measure the
4The Italian companies could benefit from the subsidy without limitations.
However, the reform states that the subsidy cannot exceed the net worth of the
company existing at the end of the tax year.
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impact of the ACE allowance both on the dividend level and the
dividend payout ratio.5 The dummy Post is 1 for the period after
the implementation of the ACE regime and zero otherwise. While
Italy is a dummy variable equal to unity for Italian companies and
zero otherwise. Therefore, the coefficient β3 for their interaction
(Postt⊗ Italyi) is 1 for Italian companies in the post-ACE reform
period and 0 otherwise, and it measures the effect of the ACE
subsidy on Italian companies.
Following Fama and French (2001), the basic equation (3.1) in-
cludes a vector 1 × K of explanatory variables (x) to control for
possible confounding factors. Clearly, to each dependent variable is
associated a specific vector of regressors x.
Namely, considering the dividend level as dependent variable,
the vector x includes the level of earnings (Earnings) to control
for firm's profitability, the level of current liabilities (CurrentLiab.)
and net debt (NetDebt) to control for the firm's debt policy, and
the firm's market capitalization (MarketCap) to capture influences
of the financial markets on firm's dividend policy. Moreover, we
include net assets (NetAssets) and equity (Equity) to control for
the firm's size, and retained earnings (RetainedEarn.) to capture
the company's propensity to keep financial assets inside the firm.
Lastly, we added year dummies to control for time-varying factors
such as macroeconomic dynamics that affect firms' dividend policy.
On the other hand, when we consider the dividend payout ra-
tio as dependent variable the vector x includes the return on asset
(ROA) that is given by the ratio of net earnings to total assets
and accounts for firms' profitability. Following Parkinson (1980) we
proxy the business risk for each company with the stock returns
volatility (Ret.V ol.) of the firm, which is computed as the standard
deviation of the log-returns calculated as the difference between the
highest, the lowest, and the closing log-price minus the open log-
price for every year from 2009 to 2017. We add the market-to-book
5The dividend payout ratio is measured as the ratio of the dividend level
paid to shareholders in a year on the equity level at the beginning of the same
year.
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ratio (M/B) to control for firms' investment opportunities. The
ratio of cash and equivalents to total liquid assets (Liq.Ratio) is
added to capture the firm's highly liquid assets disposal, on the
other hand, we capture the firm's flexibility with the ratio of fixed
assets on total assets (FixedAss.Ratio). The ratio of total debt to
total assets (Debt Ratio) to account for firms' debt policy, the ratio
between retained earnings and liquid asset (RE) is added to measure
the firm's propensity to accumulate financial resources, moreover we
added year dummies (τt).
Table 3.4 presents the estimation results considering the dividend
level as dependent variable, while Table 3.5 shows the estimates con-
sidering the dividend payout ratio as dependent variable. The tables
present regressions with and without firm fixed effects. Furthermore,
the estimates of the ACE relief effect are unaffected by the decision
to pool French and German companies considering a unique con-
trol group. Thus, we chose to separately compare them with Italian
companies. In the first two columns, we consider France as a com-
parison country, while in the third and fourth columns we consider
German companies as a comparison group.
In the regressions without firms fixed effects, we also included
a set of dummy variables to control: for age; ownership dispersion;
industry effects. The age dummies are added to capture firms' ma-
turity.6,7 The ownership dispersion (OD) dummy is added to con-
trol the effect of the manager-shareholders conflict on the dividend
policy.8 Lastly, industry dummies are included in the vector of re-
6Grullon, Michaely, and Swaminathan (2002) proposed the maturity hy-
pothesis which suggests that stable dividend increases signal the firm's life cycle
change, in particular they signal a transition to a more mature phase.
7The companies were divided into four groups based on the year in which the
initial public offering (IPO) took place. Specifically, the age group 1 includes
companies that submitted the IPO in the years after 2005; the age group 2
includes the companies that submitted the IPO between the years 2000 and
2005; the age group 3 includes the companies that submitted the IPO between
the years 1995 and 2000; and the age group 4 includes companies that submitted
the IPO before 1995.
8The Orbis database provides an indicator of the ownership dispersion. A
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gressors x in case some industries rely more on dividend payments
than others.
The estimates consistently suggest a negative effect of the ACE
reform on dividends.
During the 2009-2011 period, the average payout of Italian com-
panies is 178.5 million euros, while the average payout ratio is
5.18%.9 Given the DiD estimates, Italian companies paid on av-
erage 30,000 euros in dividends less than French companies, which
represents about 16.8%
(
30,056.937
178,500 × 100
)
of the pre-treatment pe-
riod average amount. Besides, Italian companies paid 48,000 euros
in dividends less than German companies, which represents about
23.3%
(
48,115.928
178,500 × 100
)
of the pre-ACE reform period amount. On
the other hand, following the implementation of the ACE reform,
the dividend payout ratio decreased by about 1.8 p.p. (percentage
points) relative to French companies, and by about 2.5 p.p. relative
to German companies.
Considering the lowest ACE rate we calculate that Italian com-
panies have benefited from a tax relief equal to 901,708.11 euros
(30,056,937×3%), or 1,443,477.84 euros (48,115,928×3%) depend-
ing whether we consider France or Germany as comparison country.
If Italian companies had not paid dividends in the years following the
reform they could have benefited from an overall tax relief of about
18 million euros.10 Therefore, Italian companies have renounced
on average to an ACE relief of about 17 million euros, in the pe-
riod 2012-2017. This result supports the theoretical hypothesis that
firm is classified with A if are not recorded shareholders that directly or in-
directly own more than 25% of shares outstanding. A firm is classified with
B if it is not recorded a shareholder that directly or indirectly owns more than
25% of shares outstanding, but one or more shareholders are recorded with more
than 25% direct or total ownership. A firm is classified with C or D if there
is a shareholder that directly or indirectly owns over 50% of shares outstand-
ing. Given this classification the dummy variable OD is equal to 1 if a firm is
classified with A or B, and zero otherwise.
9These data are taken from Table 3.2.
10We applied the ACE rate to the dividends actually paid during the period
2012-2017.
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public listed companies face substantial sunk cost following a sudden
omission of dividend payments.
The model estimations are significant at the 1% level as evi-
denced by the F-statistic reported at the bottom of the tables. Most
of the results found in the literature are confirmed. We observe a
positive effect of the earnings, indicating that firms with higher prof-
itability present a higher dividend level and dividend payout ratio.
Moreover, we find a negative effect of returns volatility on dividend
payouts confirming that higher uncertainty negatively affects the
dividend payout ratio. The estimates of the coefficient for the net
debt variable are positive, confirming that a negative debt position
enhances agency conflicts between bondholders and shareholders re-
sulting in lower dividend payout ratios. However, the results for
the effect of the growth opportunities (captured by the market to
book ratio coefficient) are contradictory with respect to the litera-
ture. Although, the market-to-book ratio (or Tobin's q) is also used
as a proxy for many other variables such as corporate performance,
intangibles, the quality of management, agency problems, and firm
value. Thus, its value as a proxy for growth opportunity remains
unclear.11 The age-dummies confirm that young companies have a
lower dividend payout ratio. Moreover, the dummy for the owner-
ship dispersion confirms the effectiveness of agency theory, indeed
companies with higher share ownership dispersion tend to distribute
higher dividends.
In order to capture the dynamic effects of dividend policy and
to control for autocorrelation, we consider a lagged dependent vari-
able (LDV) model by adding the lagged value of dividends in the
right-hand side of the equation (3.1).12,13 The results for the LDV
estimation are reported in Table 3.6 and 3.7. In both tables, we ob-
11Adam and Goyal (2008).
12Such models are often referred to as partial adjustment models.
13Lintner (1956) assumes that shareholders prefer steady dividend payments.
Therefore, Lintner developed a model where the manager determines the level
of dividend based on the deviation of past dividends from the optimal dividend
level.
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serve that the lagged dependent variable represents the main driver
for determining both the current dividend level and the current div-
idend payout ratio. Estimates of the impact of the ACE subsidy
remain negative and statistically significant when we consider the
dividend payout ratio as dependent variable.
As evidenced by Nickell (1981) the limited availability of years
determines bias in the LDV model, especially when we add firms
fixed effects. Indeed, due to the demeaning operation, the lagged de-
pendent variable cannot be independently distributed with respect
to the error term. We employ a System Generalized Method of Mo-
ments (GMM) estimator to deal with this issue.14 The results for
the System-GMM estimation model are reported in Table 3.8. This
estimator derives from a system of two simultaneous equations: one
in levels with lagged first differences as instruments, and the other in
first differences with lagged levels as instruments. Following Rood-
man (2009) advises, we employ small-sample adjustments, orthogo-
nal deviations, and two-step robust standard errors.15
Arellano and Bond (1991)'s test is provided at the bottom of
the table and it checks for serial correlation. If the model is well
specified then we expect to not reject the null hypothesis of no auto-
correlation of the second order (AR(2)). The tests support the model
specifications. Moreover, the Table 3.8 presents the Hansen (1982)
overidentification test (J statistic) for the validity of instruments,
where under the null hypothesis the over-identifying restrictions are
valid. The high p-values for both comparison groups suggest that
the instruments are exogenous, therefore valid.
As a further robustness check, we focus on the likelihood to pay-
14See Blundell and Bond (1998).
15With small-sample adjustments t test statistic are applied instead of z test
statistic for the coefficients, and F test instead of Wald X2 test for the overall
fit of the model. Moreover, we use the "forward orthogonal deviations" (Arel-
lano and Bover, 1995) subtracting all future available observations of a variable
instead of subtracting the previous observation from the contemporaneous one.
Lastly, the estimation for the System-GMM estimator is performed with the
two-step robust standard errors that provide Windmeijer (2005)'s finite-sample
correction for the two-step covariance matrix.
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out a dividend, accordingly we consider as dependent variable a bi-
nary variable that is equal to 1 if the company has paid a dividend
during the year and zero vice versa. Here we briefly describe the
variables employed in order to test the research hypotheses.
Logit(yit) = α+ β2Italyi + β3Postt ⊗ Italyi + xitβ + τt + εit.
(3.2)
Table 3.9 presents the estimates of the log odds for this spec-
ification model. The estimator for the DiD dummy is once again
significantly different from zero and negative, therefore the ACE
subsidy had a statistically significant impact on the likelihood of
Italian firms of paying out a dividend.
Hence, we conclude that the ACE regime had a negative impact
on the dividend payout ratio and more generally on the likelihood
of paying a dividend. The evidences suggest that companies did
not fully exploit the tax benefits provided by the ACE reform. The
rigidity of the dividend policy of Italian companies is in line with
previous evidences on the effectiveness of sunk costs deriving from
a sudden omission of dividend payouts. Through a back-of-envelope
calculations we provided a lower-bound of the agency and signaling
cost the manager's decisions.
In the last section, we simulate the response of a manager to the
introduction of a tax relief as the ACE regime using the estimated
manager's preference parameters obtained from the estimation of the
dynamic programming discrete choice model in the previous chapter.
The objective is to simulate how the subsidy can reduce or eliminate
the cost of varying the dividend policy.
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Table 3.4: Difference-in-Differences Analysis
Empirical Difference-in-Differences
Model:
Dependent Dividend Level
Variable:
Comparison France Germany
Country:
Italy 24382.1∗ 41536.7∗∗
(13463.0) (16885.7)
Post⊗Italy -30056.9∗∗ -28409.1∗∗ -48115.9∗∗ -23529.5∗
(14985.6) (12827.9) (20810.7) (12353.8)
Earnings 0.122∗∗∗ 0.170∗∗∗ 0.116∗∗∗ 0.128∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.013) (0.029) (0.034)
Current Liab. -0.010∗∗∗ 0.016 -0.001 -0.014
(0.004) (0.010) (0.005) (0.012)
Net Debt -0.018∗ 0.017 -0.009∗∗ 0.001
(0.009) (0.013) (0.004) (0.008)
Market Cap. 0.012∗∗∗ 0.003 0.016∗∗∗ 0.005∗
(0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003)
Net Assets -0.181∗∗∗ -0.093∗∗∗ -0.186∗∗∗ 0.029
(0.040) (0.030) (0.057) (0.020)
Equity 0.201∗∗∗ 0.088∗∗∗ 0.173∗∗∗ 0.006
(0.040) (0.023) (0.061) (0.023)
Retained -0.027∗∗ -0.011∗∗ 0.003 -0.021∗∗∗
Earn. (0.013) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006)
OD 22900.6∗∗∗ 4985.2
(5048.881) (4026.211)
Age-Group 1 -2480.0 35236.3∗∗∗
(7056.4) (8307.0)
Age-Group 2 -5857.9 35080.3∗∗∗
(7929.9) (8049.7)
Age-Group 3 16045.3∗∗ 17946.3∗∗
(7076.6) (7808.0)
80
3.3. ECONOMETRIC MODELS AND RESULTS
Constant 4885.0 -16117.2 -17174.8 -10059.2
(9720.9) (26332.1) (11007.4) (15130.2)
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Yes - Yes -
Firm Fixed - Yes - Yes
Effects
No. of Obs. 1808 1808 2501 2501
R-Squared 91% 55% 91% 63%
F-Statistic 117.53∗∗∗ 362.41∗∗∗ 60.58∗∗∗ 194.04∗∗∗
LR X2 547.87∗∗∗ 144.23∗∗∗ 761.09∗∗∗ 111.51∗∗∗
Note: The table reports the difference in differences estimates of the
ACE subsidy. t statistics are reported in parentheses, and ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗
stand for significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.
The independent variables are one-year lagged. The models are
tested with White's corrected heteroscedasticity robust regressions.
81
CHAPTER 3. CASE STUDY: THE ACE TAX REGIME
Table 3.5: Difference-in-Differences Analysis
Empirical Model: Difference-in-Differences
Dependent Var.: Dividend Payout Ratio
Comparison France Germany
Country:
Italy 0.016∗∗ 0.018∗∗
(0.007) (0.007)
Post⊗Italy -0.018∗∗ -0.017∗∗ -0.025∗∗∗ -0.026∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007)
ROA 0.001∗∗ 0.000∗ 0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Ret. Vol. -0.032∗∗∗ 0.005 -0.044∗∗∗ -0.001
(0.012) (0.013) (0.007) (0.005)
M.B. Ratio 0.006∗∗ 0.004 0.000 0.000
(0.003) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000)
Liq. Ratio 0.009 0.032∗ 0.031∗∗∗ 0.024
(0.010) (0.018) (0.009) (0.022)
Fixed Ass. -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000 -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000
Ratio (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Debt Ratio 0.001∗ 0.000 0.000∗ 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
RE Ratio 0.009∗∗∗ 0.000 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000
(0.002) (0.005) (0.000) (0.000)
Age-Group 1 -0.008∗∗ -0.010∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004)
Age-Group 2 -0.008∗ -0.000
(0.004) (0.004)
Age-Group 3 -0.010∗∗∗ -0.005
(0.003) (0.004)
OD 0.015∗∗∗ 0.005
(0.002) (0.003)
Constant 0.024∗∗∗ 0.032∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
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Year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Yes - Yes -
Firm Fixed - Yes - Yes
Effects
No. of Obs. 1776 1776 2464 2464
R-Squared 9% 3% 6% 2%
F-Statistic 10.85∗∗∗ 4.06∗∗∗ 6.59∗∗∗ 2.52∗∗∗
Note: The table reports the difference in differences estimates of the
ACE subsidy. t statistics are reported in parentheses, and ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗
stand for significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.
The independent variables are one-year lagged. The models are
tested with White's corrected heteroscedasticity robust regressions.
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Table 3.6: Difference-in-Differences with Lagged Dependent
Variable
Empirical Difference-in-Differences
Model:
Dependent Dividend Level
Variable:
Comparison France Germany
Country:
Italy 12334.9 6178.5
(12778.2) (9951.1)
Post⊗Italy -20279.1 -25808.7∗∗ -22305.1 -14389.2
(12702.3) (11775.0) (14600.0) (10693.1)
Earnings 0.064∗∗ 0.148∗∗∗ 0.025 0.083∗∗
(0.031) (0.024) (0.036) (0.034)
Current Liab. -0.003 0.012∗ 0.005∗ -0.013
(0.004) (0.007) (0.003) (0.009)
Net Debt -0.014 0.015 -0.003 -0.000
(0.009) (0.014) (0.002) (0.006)
Market Cap. 0.008∗∗∗ 0.002 0.008∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002)
Net Assets -0.123∗∗∗ -0.088∗∗∗ -0.052∗∗ 0.028∗
(0.039) (0.024) (0.023) (0.015)
Equity 0.132∗∗∗ 0.088∗∗∗ 0.039∗ -0.003
(0.041) (0.020) (0.023) (0.017)
Retained Earn. -0.022∗ -0.012∗∗ -0.000 -0.021∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003)
OD 14501.9∗∗∗ -484.4
(4673.2) (1842.4)
Age-Group 1 -3133.7 11763.5∗∗
(6100.1) (5861.0)
Age-Group 2 -3957.5 8855.7
(5240.3) (5500.2)
Age-Group 3 6502.2 6524.2
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(7249.7) (4972.0)
Lag. Div. 0.476∗∗∗ 0.166 0.729∗∗∗ 0.388∗∗∗
(0.144) (0.223) (0.105) (0.067)
Constant 8001.2 -17221.1 7469.6 -212.7
(7897.1) (24309.5) (6631.3) (11386.4)
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Yes - Yes -
Firm Fixed - Yes - Yes
Effects
No. of Obs. 1808 1808 2501 2501
R-Squared 93% 57% 96% 69%
F-Statistic 335.99∗∗∗ 567.71∗∗∗ 283.20∗∗∗ 364.27∗∗∗
LR X2 547.87∗∗∗ 144.23∗∗∗ 761.09∗∗∗ 111.51∗∗∗
Note: The table reports the difference in differences estimates of the
ACE subsidy. t statistics are reported in parentheses, and ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗
stand for significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.
The independent variables are one-year lagged. The models are
tested with White's corrected heteroscedasticity robust regressions.
85
CHAPTER 3. CASE STUDY: THE ACE TAX REGIME
Table 3.7: Difference-in-Differences with Lagged Dependent
Variable
Empirical Difference-in-Differences
Model:
Dependent Dividend Payout Ratio
Variable
Comparison France Germany
Country:
Italy 0.009 -0.001
(0.006) (0.005)
Post⊗Italy -0.015∗∗ -0.016∗∗∗ -0.008 -0.018∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
ROA 0.000 0.000∗ -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Ret. Vol. -0.007 0.010 -0.004 0.003
(0.013) (0.015) (0.004) (0.005)
M.B. Ratio 0.003 0.003 -0.000 0.000
(0.002) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000)
Liq. Ratio 0.005 0.027 0.010∗ 0.018
(0.010) (0.018) (0.006) (0.019)
Fixed Ass. Ratio -0.000 -0.000 -0.000∗∗ -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Debt Ratio 0.000 0.000 0.000∗∗ 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
RE Ratio 0.004∗∗∗ -0.001 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000
(0.001) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000)
Age-Group 1 -0.005 -0.003
(0.004) (0.002)
Age-Group 2 -0.003 0.000
(0.004) (0.002)
Age-Group 3 -0.007∗∗ -0.001
(0.003) (0.002)
OD 0.007∗∗∗ 0.002
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(0.002) (0.002)
Lag. D.P.R. 0.519∗∗∗ 0.183∗∗ 0.801∗∗∗ 0.367∗∗∗
(0.127) (0.074) (0.051) (0.088)
Constant 0.010 0.025∗∗∗ 0.008∗ 0.023∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.004) (0.006)
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Yes - Yes -
Firm Fixed - Yes - Yes
Effects
No. of Obs. 1776 1776 2460 2460
R-Squared 28% 6% 62% 13%
F-Statistic 22.47∗∗∗ 5.68∗∗∗ 31.36∗∗∗ 6.86∗∗∗
Note: The table reports the difference in differences estimates of the
ACE subsidy. t statistics are reported in parentheses, and ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗
stand for significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.
The independent variables are one-year lagged. The models are
tested with White's corrected heteroscedasticity robust regressions.
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Table 3.8: Dynamic Panel Data Estimation
Empirical Model: System-GMM
Dependent Var.: Dividend Payout Ratio
Comparison France Germany
Country:
Italy 0.008 0.003
(0.006) (0.006)
Post⊗Italy -0.013∗∗ -0.012∗∗
(0.005) (0.006)
ROA 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Ret. Vol. -0.019∗∗ -0.013
(0.009) (0.010)
M.B. Ratio 0.003 -0.000
(0.004) (0.000)
Liq. Ratio 0.004 0.012
(0.010) (0.008)
Fixed Ass. Ratio -0.000∗∗ -0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Debt Ratio 0.001∗ 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
RE Ratio 0.009 -0.000
(0.007) (0.000)
OD 0.007∗∗ 0.002
(0.003) (0.002)
Age-Group 1 -0.005 -0.004
(0.004) (0.003)
Age-Group 2 -0.004 -0.000
(0.005) (0.003)
Age-Group 3 -0.006 -0.001
(0.005) (0.003)
Lag. D.P.R. 0.450∗∗∗ 0.630∗∗∗
(0.133) (0.162)
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Constant 0.025∗∗ 0.024∗∗
Year Yes Yes
Industry Yes Yes
No. of Obs. 1776 2460
F-Statistic 9.98 23.99
Arellano-Bond test
for AR(1): 0.013 0.004
for AR(2): 0.118 0.596
Hansen overidentifying test
Prob > chi2 = 0.116 0.486
Number of instruments
29 29
Note: The table reports the estimates for the system-GMM
model. t statistics are reported in parentheses, and ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗
stand for significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.
The models are tested with two-step robust standard errors.
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Table 3.9: Panel Logit Estimation
Empirical Model: Panel Logit
Dependent Var.: Dividend Payout Ratio
Comparison France Germany
Country:
Post 0.246 0.356
(0.387) (0.280)
Post⊗Italy -2.093∗∗∗ -2.831∗∗∗
(0.811) (0.771)
ROA 0.098 0.309
(0.075) (0.280)
Ret. Vol. 0.296 -0.321
(0.648) (0.615)
M.B. Ratio 0.270 0.768∗∗∗
(0.413) (0.293)
Liq. Ratio 2.219∗ -0.321
(1.322) (0.890)
Fixed Ass. Ratio 0.017 -0.040
(0.036) (0.038)
Debt Ratio -0.207 0.018
(0.178) (0.050)
RE Ratio 1.011 1.634∗∗
(1.391) (0.804)
Lag. D. 1.887∗∗∗ 1.553∗∗∗
(0.247) (0.181)
Fixed Effects Yes Yes
No. of Obs. 705 1027
LR chi2(15) 207.07∗∗∗ 187.94∗∗∗
Note: The table reports the logit estimates with firms fixed
effects. t statistics are reported in parentheses, and ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗
stand for significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.
The models are tested with two-step robust standard errors.
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3.4 Counterfactual Analysis of Tax Relief
Policy forecasts very often require a structural approach that at-
tempts to uncover the underlying preferences u, differently from the
traditional reduced-form approach which can be viewed as uncov-
ering the historical stochastic process for {dt, xt}. The issue related
to reduced-form methods is that policy changes induce managers to
re-optimize, yielding a new controlled stochastic process for {dt, xt},
generally different from the historical process of the previous policy
regime.16 The structural approach instead allows us to solve the
dynamic programming problem under a new policy regime and to
derive the predicted stochastic process for {dt, xt}.
We evaluate the impact of a policy change on the conditional
probability to payout dividends consistent with the ACE tax relief .
First of all, we provide further evaluation of the DP model di-
rectly comparing the nonparametric estimates of the actual condi-
tional choice probability Pˆ (d|x) to the nonparametric estimates of
the simulated conditional choice probability P (d|x, θˆ). Given the
discreteness of the state and control variables, the nonparametric
estimate of Pˆ is simply the sample histogram of choices made by
firms whose state is x. The conditional choice probability function
P (d|x, θˆ) for the dynamic programming model is computed as fre-
quency estimator from the simulated series of managers' choices. To
simulate the manager choices and calculate the conditional choice
probability, we implemented the same estimation procedure pro-
vided in Section 2.3.3.17
We calculate the expected utility at time t and the expected
discounted utility net of ε(d) for each choice d, earning level x, and
for the state dependence deriving from the choice of the previous
period. Then, using the method of successive approximations we
compute the fixed points υ of the Bellman operator Ψ (Equation
2.17), that converges linearly and globally to a specific tolerance
16See Marschak (1953) and Lucas (1976).
17Specifically, we estimate the parameters of the manager's utility function
pooling the sample, thus not considering the ownership dispersion indicator.
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level.18
Once computed the differences in the expected discounted utility
for all (x, d) ∈ X × {0, 1}, we simulate the dividend policy for N
firms and T periods. We settle N = 1, 000 for a time-horizon of
ten years (T = 10). We consider homogeneous companies, therefore
adding one more year is equivalent to adding one more firm for
the estimation. Furthermore, we assume that dividend choices are
independent of the company's investment policy and the dividend
policies of other companies on the market.19
The observable state variable (xt) is a stationary ergodic process,
and we assume that the first-period dividend payout equals to zero:
d0 = 0. Hence, we draw the first period earnings (xi1) from the
stationary probability P∞k = limt→∞Pr(xit = x).
Hence, we simulate N choices for the first period. Specifically,
we randomly draw the values of εi1(1) and εi1(0) and compare
them with the difference in the utilities U(xi1, 1) and U(xi1, 0). If
∆U(xi1, 0) > −∆i1 then we set di1 = 1; otherwise, di1 = 0. Then,
N new values of xit are simulated using the transition probability
matrix Π. Therefore, we iteratively proceed adding new rows and
ultimately forming the T x N matrix of earnings histories, and the
T x N matrix of dividend policy histories.
Figure 3.2 compares the actual and simulated conditional choice
probability for each cell in x. We observe that the DP model can
replicate the dividend choice frequencies of the sample, providing
further validation. Hence, we are confident in the validity of the
model's predictions, so we proceed to exploit the features of the
stochastic dynamic programming model.
We aim to investigate the sensitivity of the payout conditional
probability to different levels of tax relief. Therefore, we add to the
manager's utility function a tax relief (τ) on dividend payments.
Equation (3.3) shows the new specification for the manager's utility
function.
18We set the maximum tolerance level to 1 ∗ 10−10.
19Thus, dividend policy of firm i is not affected by the dividend policy of firm
j.
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u(xt, ε, dt, θ) =
{
−θ01yt + θ02kt + θ03τyt + εt(0) if dt = 0
− θ11yt + θ12(1− kt)− θ13τyt + εt(1) if dt = 1
(3.3)
Again, the dynamic programming problem and the associated
likelihood function can be numerically computed in a subroutine of
a standard nonlinear maximum likelihood algorithm. Recovering the
new underlying utility function is useful for quantifying the extent
to which the policy change hurts managers.
Table 3.10 provides the parameter estimates of equation (3.3).
The first column shows the parameter estimates for the actual
choices and states given by the data sample on French and German
companies. Taking these estimates as starting values, we simulated
the manager choices, and we estimated the parameters for the simu-
lated data. The second column provides the estimation results. The
third and the fourth columns provide the estimates of the param-
eters of the manager's utility function for levels of the tax relief of
3% and 5%, respectively.
Table 3.10 shows that the introduction of tax relief significantly
reduces agency conflict and sunk costs, θ01 and θ02 respectively. Fig-
ure 3.3 shows the distribution of the conditional choice probability
with respect to the tax relief τ , and for different earning levels. As
in Section 2.3.2, the earnings are discretized in in intervals of the
same length. In Figure 3.3 we consider only three earnings intervals,
y. Specifically, we consider the lowest (y = 1), the middle (y = 10),
and the highest (y = 20) intervals. Considering ten years period,
the Figure shows that the implementation of tax relief policy sig-
nificantly reduces the conditional probability of paying dividends,
especially for those companies in the highest earnings interval. In
fact, with a 4% tax relief, we see a six percentage point reduction in
the conditional probability of paying dividends.
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Figure 3.2: Dividend Payout Conditional Probability - Actual vs
Predicted
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Figure 3.3: Simulation of the Conditional Choice Probability
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Conclusion
This thesis starts reviewing the different theories on dividends and
the empirical results in the literature. By following the dividend lit-
erature, we formulated a model to measure some of the regularities
of the dividend payout policy, and to understand if company char-
acteristics influence investors' preferences and therefore the decision
to accumulate cash or pay shareholders. Specifically, we developed
a discrete choice model where a rational, forward-looking manager
chooses the optimal dividend payout policy to minimize the agency
cost deriving from the manager-shareholders conflict. Moreover, we
embodied the sunk cost fallacy within the manager's utility function,
(Arkes and Blumer, 1985; Thaler, 1980). The definition and estima-
tion of the sunk cost in dividend policy represent the novelty of this
study. In particular, we estimated the discrete choice dynamic pro-
gramming model through the nested fixed point algorithm proposed
by Rust (1987). Our discrete choice model yields estimates consis-
tent with existing empirical evidence; in particular, we observe that
the ownership dispersion significantly affects the managers' dividend
policy, (Eckbo and Verma, 1994; Jensen, Solberg, and Zorn, 1992).
Finally, we analyzed the allowances on corporate equity (ACE),
a policy aimed at lowering the use of leverage by incentivizing the
companies to retain earnings. Italy implemented this reform during
the years 2011-2019. The reform has significantly impacted the divi-
dend policy of Italian companies. However, we observed that Italian
companies haven't fully exploited the tax relief because of the sunk
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cost of dividend policy changes.
Confident of the reliability of our dynamic discrete choice model,
we implemented the effect of the ACE reform and measured the vari-
ation in the conditional probability of paying dividends for different
levels of tax relief. We have estimated that the implementation of a
tax relief of 4% for ten years results in an average decrease of 50%
of the conditional probability of paying dividends.
Possible future developments of this work include the consider-
ation of unobserved permanent state dependence and the endoge-
nization of the managers' investment policy. The greater realism
and sophistication of the model would reward the considerable com-
putational complexity.
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